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Introduction
On the eve ofthe next apportionment, the Supreme Court is caught in the
throes of the last. For the fourth time in less than ten years, 1 the North
Carolina congressional districts at issue in Shaw v. Reno' (Shaw 1) are making
an appearance before the Supreme Court.3 Although the cast of characters
differs slightly, the interconnected issues presented in Shaw I nevertheless
remain the same. First, to what extent may state actors rely on racial demographics while performing their redistricting duty? Second, what is the proper
1. See Cromartie v. Hunt, No. 4-96-CV-104-BO(3), slip op. at 2-10 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 7,
2000) [hereinafter Cromartie ]] (discussing history of North Carolina's Twelfth Congressional
District in Supreme Court), cert granted,120 S.Ct. 2715 (2000); Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S.
541,543-54 (1999) [hereinafter Cromartie 1] (considering equal protection challenge to North
Carolina's Twelfth Congressional District); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899,901 (1996) [hereinafter
Shaw 11] (noting that Supreme Court was discussing North Carolina's redistricting plan for
second time); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,633-58 (1993) [hereinafter Shaw I] (discussing claim
that North Carolina's Twelfth Congressional District violates Fourteenth Amendment), rev'd
sub. nom. Shaw 1, 517 U.S. 899 (1996)..
2. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
3. See Cromartie 11, slip op. at 29-30 (discussing North Carolina's Twelfth Congressiotial District).
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doctrinal approach for rooting out ostensibly unconstitutional reliance on racebased redistricting? Third, can the Supreme Court and lower courts consistently distinguish between race consciousness and race motivation?
As an instittion, the Court has been unable to answer these questions
with any clarity or predictability. Instead, the Court has splintered into three
camps. For some members of the Court, any evidence of race consciousness
invalidates the infected district absent compelling reasons. On this reading of
the Constitution, race consciousness is race motivation.4 For others, evidence
of race consciousness, standing alone, is not nearly enough to implicate the
Constitution. For this second faction, redistricting does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause "unless the effect of the redistricting plan is to deny a
particular group equal access to the political process or to minimize its voting
strength unduly."5 For the remaining members of the Court, particularly
Justice O'Connor, it is the excessive reliance on race, something akin to uberrace consciousness - the ostentatious display ofrace consciousness run amok that offends the Equal Protection Clause.'
These various approaches have borne much doctrinal confusion. On the
one hand there is Shaw Ts commitment to the bizarre shape test, whereby a
district is subject to strict scrutiny review if its shape is bizarre and the process
that led to its creation is race conscious. 7 On the other hand, there is Miller v.
Johnson'sI predominant factortest, which focuses instead on whether race was
a predominant factor in the ultimate placement of voters within one district or
4. See, e.g., Cromartie , 526 U.S. at 546 ("Our decisions have established that all laws
that classify citizens on the basis of race, including racially gerrymandered districting schemes,
are constitutionally suspect and must be strictly scrutinized."); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 999
(1996) (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating "application of strict scrutiny in this suit was never a
close question").

5. Shaw , 509 U.S. at 676 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Even within this camp, there are
important nuances. Justice Stevens advocated that the state violates the Equal Protection Clause
only "when the State creates... uncouth district boundaries... for the sole purpose of making
it more difficult for members of a minority group to win an election." Id. at 677 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). For Justice Stevens, "minority" is not solely defined by the adjective "racial." Id
at 678. "Minority" is any "politically weak segment of the community." Karcher v. Daggett,
462 U.S. 725, 748 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("If they serve no purpose other than to favor one
segment - whether racial, ethnic, religious, economic, or political - that may occupy a position
of strengt.h at a particular point in time, or to disadvantage a politically weak segment of the
community, they violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.").
6. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 929 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating
"Shaw's basic objective of making extreme instances of gerrymandering subject to meaningful

judicial review").
7. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630,644 (1993) (stating that bizarre shape of district on its face
requires strict scrutiny).
8. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
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another.9 On their face, these two approaches stand in direct tension. Despite
these doctrinal difficulties, the Court, to its credit, has attempted to blend
symbiotically Shaw I and Miller's differing approaches into an interesting
evidentiary and doctrinal dialectic.1" All the same, the initial tension remains.
The Court's racial redistricting doctrine is committed to at least two different
constitutional tests, two competing ways by which the use of race may offend
the Equal Protection Clause.
Hunt v. Cromartie(Cromartie 1I)" presents the Court with its first opportunity this millennium to bring some semblance of clarity to this area of
law and to resolve the tension created by Shaw I and Miller. Of equal importance, CromartieII also will test the Court's avowed commitment to maintain
a distinction between racial motivation and racial consciousness or awareness
in the voting rights context. In so doing, CrdmartieIlthreatens to lay bare the

doctrine's vacuity.
CromartieY/'s impact is potentially destabilizing because of the manner
in which the factual circumstances of the case interact with the Court's
wrongful districting doctrine. One specific fact of the case stands out rather
conspicuously: While the notoriously ubiquitous Districts 1 and 12 are once
again the subject of constitutional scrutiny, unlike their predecessors,1 2 these
districts are no longer majority-minority districts. Moreover, a reasonable
observer may conclude that they are not even bizarre." These facts raise at
least three important questions.
9. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,916-19 (1995) (discussing operation of predominant factor test).
10. Miller's intent standard provides Shaw's bizarre shape test with doctrinal legitimacy
by anchoring Shaw within the Court's traditional equal protection jurisprudence. And of course,
as we noted supranote 9 and accompanying text, Shaw rs focus on shape provides Millerwith
the evidence necessary to infer intent
11.
4-96-CV-104-BO(3), slip op. at 2-10 (E.D-N.C. Mar. 7, 2000).
12. See supra note 1 (citing cases noting equal protection issue). This is not to say that
the Supreme Court has never upheld a race conscious district, for it has done so three previous
times. Unlike the proess that led to the creation of the challenged District Twelve, however,
these upheld districts were either drawn by special masters, see DeWitt v. Wilson, 515 U.S.
1170 (1995) (mem.), affg 856 F. Supp. 1409 (E.D. Cal. 1994), courts, see Busbee v. Smith,
549 F. Supp. 494 (D.D.C. 1982) (three-judge court), affd,459 U.S. 1166 (1983), or modified
and approved by a federal court from its original creation by a state supreme court, see Lawyer
v. Dep't of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 569-75 (1997) (approving state supreme court's revision of
redistricting plan).
13. We emphasize that the district may be seen as non-bizarre, nothing more. In making
this claim, we are aware that the district fails the PildesiNiemiperimeter and dispersion tests.
See infra text accompanying notes 226-35. We also note that in CromartieI, Justice Thomas
described the district as bizarre. Cromartie1, 526 U.S. 541, 549 (1999) ("To be sure, appellants
did not contest the evidence of District 12's shape (which hardly could be contested)."). Much
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First, may prospective plaintiffs challenge majority-white districts on
Shaw/Millergrounds? In other words, when the Court refers to a "significant
number of voters" as the threshold indicating a predominant motive to "segregate," how "significant" is significant? Prior to CromartieI, one could have

interpreted the Court's racial districting doctrine, as some have, 14 to say that
only majority-minority districts are subject to strict constitutional scrutiny.

After all, and as we argue below,' 5 the leading explanation for Shaw Ts position - the "expressive harms" theory 6 - loses much of its explanatory power
once voters of color represent less than 50% of registered voters in a given
district. In CromartieI, and in light of the extant doctrine, North Carolina's
General Assembly may have done the only sensible thing left to do to avoid

litigation: It did not draw any district in which voters of color are more than
50% of all registered voters. Nonetheless, the lower court subjected both District 1 and District 12 to strict scrutiny and struck down District 12.1' This
question is thus important because its answer may provide redistricters a safe
haven from constitutional attack and shelter the hard-fought political gains of

politicians of color from constitutional scrutiny. Districters need to win most
of the time and the Court needs to find a way to make that happen.
The second question looks specifically to Miller's "predominant motive"
test and asks whether, in light of the myriad and mutually reinforcing "purcan be said against statistical measurements of compactness. See Micah Altman, What Are
Judicially Manageable Standards for Red'stricting? Evidence from History 12, 12-13, at
http'/www-rdc.fas.harvard.edu/staff/micha_altman/papers/his_notcl_l.pdf Oast modified May
21, 1996) (stating that "geographical compactness measures, disagree more often than not" and
that "judge's choice of compactness measures will greatly affect the type of districting plans that
she accepts"). Even assuming the reliability of these measures, statistical measurements of
compactness arc not our concern. We look to the central import of the "expressive harms"
theory, which hinges on the messages expressed by district maps, not on whether a given district
fails a chosen statistical test. In this way, our point is simply that the district in question may
be seen as ordinary. Standing alone, the map does not jump off the page the way that the original map of District 12 might have. For a graphic representation of the 1992, 1997, and 1998
versions of District 12, see infra text accompanying notes 233-34.
14. See, e.g., Sue T. Kilgore, Between the Devil & the Deep Blue Sea: Courts,Legislalures, &Majority-MinoriyDistrictr,46 CAuL U. L. REV. 1299,1342-43 (1997) (stating "unlike
majority-minority districts, bizarrely shaped majority-white districts need not withstand strict
scrutiny because compactness is not a constitutional requirement").
15. See infraPartIV3.1.
16. See Richard H. Pildes &Richard G.Niemi, Expressive Harms, "BizarreDistric "and
VotingRights: EvaluaingElection-DistrictAppearancesAfter
Shaw v.Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV.
483, 506-16 (1993) (arguing that "expressive harms are constitutionally cognizable").
17. The original Cromartiesuit resulted in the grant of a summary judgment motion in
favor of the plaintiffs. See generally Cromartie v. Hunt, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (E.D.N.C. 1998).
On remand, the three-judge panel proceeded to conduct a trial, only to reach a similar conclusion.
See Cromartie II, No. 4- 96-CV-104-BO(3), slip op. at 30 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 7,2000).
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poses" involved in a redistricting plan, a bright-line method exists for singling
out the "predominant" purpose with relative consistency. Here, the worry is
that the Court has failed to consider seriously the interplay ofpolitical factors,

including racial motivation, in the redistricting process."' Given the flux and
variability of political factors and their interaction with racial considerations,
what does "predominant factor" in fact mean?
Third and last, what are the implications of subjecting influence districts

(i.e., majority-white districts with "significant" populations of color) to strict
scrutiny? In other words, is Justice O'Connor correct when she assured us

that the Court's doctrine will not subject "the vast majority of the Nation's
435 congressional districts" to constitutional inquiry "even though race may
well have been considered in the redistricting process"?' 9 Or, have political

losers been given the green light to revisit redistricting battles - lost in state
legislatures - in
federal court by attacking districts with "significant" popula20
tions of color?
One goal of this Article is to provide answers to some of these difficult
questions. We have a second goal as well. In general, commentators agree that
the doctrine in this area "teeters on the brink of legal incoherence and political

chaos.'

We agree with this assessment. As such, we take on the role of a

"conscientious district court judge"' faced with future Shaw claims. Our
second aim is then to suggest some modifications in the doctrine to provide
18. See, e.g., J. MORGANKOUSSER, COLORBI.NDIhNSTICE: MINORrYVoTMNGRIGHrS
AND THE UNDONG OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION5 (1999) [hereinafterKoUssER, COLORBLIND INUSTICE] (explaining tradition of "consideration of race, party, or incumbency" in
redistricting); J.MORGANKOUSSER, ThE SHAPINGooF SoTrTHERNPoIaCS 7(1974) [hereinafter
KoussER, SOUHERN PolzTcs] ("Excluding Negros from politics did have partisan as well as
racial consequences.").
19.
1iller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 928-29 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
20. See Thomas B. Edsall, PartiesPlay VotingRightsRole Reversal,WAsiL PosT, Feb.
25, 2001, atA04 ("Republicans... are gearing up to counter the efforts of Democrats to spread

out minority voters.").
21. Richard Ri Pildes, PincipledLinitationson Racialand PartisanRedistricting,106
YALE L.i. 2505,2505 (1997); see also Samuel Issacharoff& Thomas C. Goldstein, Identifring
the Harm in RacialGerrymanderingClaims, 1 MICH. . RACE & L. 47, 48 (1996) (stating that
"[a]lmost all students of this 'racial gerrymandering' doctrine agree that the constitutional
commands of Shaw and its progeny leave a great deal unresolved"); Pamela S. Karlan, The Fire
NextTime: ReapportionmentAfterthe 2000 Census,50 STAN. L. REV. 731,731 (1998) ("Ifyou
tried to plot the Supreme Court's decisions regulating politics on a graph, you couldn't fit a
straight line through the points.").
22. See Paul L. McKaskle, The Voting RightsAct and the "ConscientiousRedistricter,"
30 U.SF. L. REV. 1, 4-7 (1995) (arguing as conscientious redistricter attempting to comply with
Voting Rights Act); f Paul Brest, The ConscientiousLegislator'sGuide to Constitutional
Interpretation,27 STAN. L. REV. 585,587 (1975) (taking perspective of conscientious legislator
to illustrate constitutional assessment of proposed legislation).
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better guidance to lower courts faced with these types of cases. We divide our
effort into four Parts. In Part I, we explore the possible interpretations of the

Court's wrongful districting cases. In so doing, we seek to illuminate the
modem state of the law. In Part II, we provide in-depth background and an
account of the facts as presented in Cromartieff. Our aim is to demonstrate
vividly the nature of the facts presented in post-Shaw redistricting litigation.
In Part II, we argue that political variables, defined to include racial consider-

ations, serve as constraints on the discretion of redistricters. We then apply
Andrew Gelman and Gary King's "Judgelt" statistical model to the facts in
CromartieH. Based on our analysis, we concludethat political gerrymandering isthebestexplanationforNorth Carolina's 1997 redistricting plan. Finally,
in Part IV, we analyze the implications ofthe likely dispositions of Cromarlie
I. We argue thatthe Court should reinterpret Shaw I as establishing a bright-

line outer limit on state redistricters' traditional discretion. In this sense, we
could read Shaw (andMiller)as a corrective, a strong medicine applicable only
in the extreme cases of uber-race consciousness. 4 We offer as a doctrinal
guide the political gerrymandering case of Davis v. Bandemer' and suggest
thatBandemer's standard should govern Shaw-type claims. 6

23.
Gelman and King's statistical methodology is explained in two articles. See Andrew
Gelman & Gary King, A UnifiedMethod of EvaluatingElectoralSystems and Redistricting
Plans,38 AM J. Poi. S. 514,514-41 (1994) [hereinafter Gelman & King, UnifiedMethod]
(describing statisical model to analyze redistricting plans and electoral systems); Andrew
Gelman & Gary King, EnhancingDemocracyThrough LegislativeRedistricting,88 AM. POL.
Scm RaV. 541,544-59 (1994) [hereinafter Gelman & King, EnhancingDemocracy](analyzing
redistricting study data in several states using statistical model). Gelman and King wrote a
computer program, "Judget," to implement the model and calculate better estimates to measure,
inter alia, electoral responsiveness, which is the dependent variable that we use for our analysis
in Part II.B. Gelman and King's model is useful for understanding an election that has taken
place, predicting future elections under a now redistricting plan, and for evaluating past
elections. We use "Judgelt" to evaluate the electoral responsiveness, defined in Part IILB, of
North Carolina's 1992,1997, and 1998 Plans.
24.
To be clear, we do not take a position on the merits of Shaw I itself. Our aim is to
suggest how the Court might render the doctrine more coherent without sacrificing the interests
ofvoters of color.
25. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
26. See generally Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (articulating standard for
showing discriminatory vote dilution in political gerrymandering case); infra notes 360-64 and
accompanying text (discussing adoption of looser Davis standard). We do not spell out specifically in this Article how Bandemer would affect wrongful districting claims. We develop this
point more carefully in Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Gerrymandering, Equal Protection, and the
Modem Redistricting Revolution: A Plea for Due Deference (unpublished manuscript, on file
with Washington and Lee Law Review) and Guy-Uriel E.Charles, How Race Matters: Racial
and Political Identity in the Racial Redistricting Cases (unpublished manuscript, on file with
Washington andLee LawReview).
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Before turning to Part I, a word on the issue of mootness is necessary.
While the subsequent crafting of electoral districts in light of the 2000 Census
mayrender the specific questions in CromartieHmoot, CromartieHis deserving of close attention for two reasons. First, the issues presented in Cromartie
// will arise again in coming years, as other states will likely follow North
Carolina's lead when drafting their own electoral plans. Hence, while Cromartie Hmay become moot, the general issues presented bythe case will not.'
We thus understand CromartieH as the bellwether for the new round of
redistricting after the millennial census. We utilize Cromartie!in this Article
as a very useful case study to explore the questions raised in the previous
paragraphs; these are questions that the Court will have to face eventually in
either CromartieH or in subsequent cases.
Second, as political insiders readily acknowledge, previous rounds of
redistricting often profoundly influence subsequent rounds.' Additionally,
for preclearance purposes under Section 5,' courts use previous rounds as
baselines for future evaluation.3" As such, the constitutional questions raised
in CromartieH are important in their own right, independent of the specific
issues of the case itself narrowly construed. We do not take a position on
whether the issues in CromartieHare precluded from review in light of Shaw
, or whether state legislatures may use '"ad districts" as baselines when constructing new plans.31 However, in light of Whitcomb v. Chavis,32 Reno v.
3 3 and Lawyer v. Department of Justice,' we would not be
Bossier Parish,
surprised if the Court holds that the issues in CromartieH are not moot and
decides the case on its merits.

27. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 140-41 (1971) (stating that challenge to
racially discriminatory multimember district was not moot in view of possibility that "the
present litigation would simply reappear for decision").
28. See KoussER, COLoRBLIND INJIsTICE, supranote 18, at 248 ("Unless the standards
of redistricting, the population distribution, partisan control, or the number of seats in the body
shift markedly from one decade to the next, redistricting begins with the status quo and generally ends close to it.").
29. See infra text accompanying notes 40-41.
30. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320,325 (2000).
31. Nor do we take a position on whether a district must be declared unconstitutional
before a new district plan is approved. See Lawyer v. Dep't of Justice, 521 U.S. 56, 575-787
(1997) (addressing whether court ought to have approved settlement agreement without formally
holding redistricting plan unconstitutional).
32. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
33. 528 U.S. 320 (2000).
34. 521 U.S. 567 (1997).
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L The Doctrine
Most observers agree that the wrongful districting doctrine is an analytical mess.35 To be sure, this is partly due to the Court's own uncertainties. But
that is not all; the questions raised in this area are difficult. Fromthe perspective of a state engaged in the redistricting process, there are at least three considerations that must be remembered.
First are the statutory demands of the amended Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 (VRA).3 6 As interpreted by the Court in Thornburg v.
Gingles, 7 a vote dilution claim is established under Section 2 when a group
demonstrates 'that it is sufficiently large and geographically compactto constitute a majority in a single-member district," that it is "politically cohesive," and
that "the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it... usually to
defeat the minority's preferred candidate."38 If a plaintiff establishes a Section
2 violation, the state may consider race conscious remedies.3 9
The second considerations are the related requirements of Section 5 of the
VRA, commonly referred to as the "preclearance" requirements. Certain
jurisdictions across the United States are "covered jurisdictions," which means
they must obtain prior approval from the Department of Justice before seeking
to institute and enforce "any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or
standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting."4 The Act also affords
jurisdictions a second preclearance path; they may instead seek a declaratory
judgment action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbin. The Attorney General has issued an extensive set of administrative
regulations to guide the preclearance process."
Finally, and as the Court in Shaw I made painfully clear, states must be
careful not to violate the Constitution, in particular the Fourteenth Amendment. If the Court finds that a district constitutes a racial classification, the
Court will strike down the plan unless the state can show that its legislation
is "narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest."42 In the
35. See supra note 21 (describing confusion surrounding wrongful districting doctrine).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
37. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
38. Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986) (citations omitted).
39. See SAMUELISsACHAROFET AL, THE LAw oF DEMoCRACY 441-519 (1998).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1994).
41. See 28 C.F.L § 51 (2000) (articulating procedures for administering Voting Rights
At).
42. Shaw , 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993). The Court's doctrine of course raises two fundamental questions with respect to the application of strict scrutiny. First, when does the use of
race trigger strict scrutiny? Second, what constitutes a compelling state interest? This Article
is primarily concerned with the first question and not very much with the second. Our argument

236
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next Part, we discuss the Equal Protection problems raised by the Court's
wrongful districting doctrine, which is the doctrinal road taken by Shaw I and
its progeny. We also offer a tentative prognosis of the Shaw/Miller doctrine in
light of the approaching round of redistricting.
A. Shaw, Miller, and the Race-BasedRedistrictingRevolution
1. Shaw andthe Shape ofDistrictsto Come
In Shaw I, Justice O'Connor noted that "reapportionment is one area in
which appearances do matter" because "[c]lassifying citizens byrace... threatens special harms that are not present in" other areas of voting rights jurisprudence.43 These general premises led to the conclusion that "redistricting

legislation that is so bizarre on its face that it is 'unexplainable on grounds
other than race"'" is justiciable pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause.4" In

doctrinal terms, Shaw _s focus on "highly irregular" districts has given rise to
the bizarre shape test, by which a district violates the Constitution when, in an
attempt to pursue greater representation for people of color, its shape becomes
too bizarre.4 6
Two terms later, the Court decided Miller v. Johnson, in which the Court
invalidated Georgia's Eleventh District on Fourteenth Amendment grounds
but pursuant to a different rationale than the one articulated in Shaw . InMiller, the Court retreated from the pronounced focus on bizarreness and shape
reflected in Shaw I to an exclusive focus on motivation and intent. 7 The

Court explained that a bizarre shape is not the touchstone of a constitutional
violation.4" Rather, a districting plan violates the Constitution when "race was
is essentially that certain types of racially gerrymandered districts should not implicate the
Court's Equal Protection jurisprudence.
43. Shaw , 509 U.S. 630,647 (1993).
44. Id. at 647,649-50.
45. Id. at 644 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,266
(1977)).
46. This is another way of saying that only bizarre majority-minority districts will come
under constitutional attack. See Pamela S. Karlan,Just Politics? Five Not So Easy Pieces of
the 1995 Term, 34 Hous. L. REV. 289, 309-10 (1997) (claiming that Court has created situation

where nonwhites "must achieve a geographically compact district or go home with nothing").
47. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 913 (1995) (approving district court's focus on
intent as predominant factor).
48. I&.at 912. The Court further stated:
Our observation in Shaw of the consequences of racial stereotyping was not meant

to suggest that a district must be bizarre on its face before there is a constitutional
violation. Nor was our conclusion in Shaw that in certain instances a district's
appearance (or, to be more precise, its appearance in combination with certain demo-

graphic evidence) can give rise to an equal protection claim.
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the predominant factor motivating the legislature's decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular district.149
' The standard
announced inMiller is commonly referred to as the predominant factor test.
In order to understand the Court's race-based voting rights jurisprudence,
we must read these cases within the larger context provided by the Supreme
Court's greater colorblind jurisprudence and the race-conscious/colorblindness battle being waged subtly within, as well as outside, the Court. This
framework gives rise to three distinct positions. One position has identified
race itself (and therefore race consciousness) as the enemy. A second position
considers only certain racially motivated disadvantages as implicating the
Constitution. The third position, the O'Connor-Kennedy-Rehnquist triumvirate, splits into two factions. Justices Kennedy and Rehnquist, whose views
are closer to the colorblind camp, are suspicious of race and solicitous toward
colorblindness as a constitutional ideal.5 ° Justice O'Connor, however, appears
willing to tolerate less visible manifestations of race conscious decisionmaking.
In light of Justice O'Connor's pivotal position in this area, 5 it is crucial
to look carefully at Justice O'Connor's bizarre shape test. She focuses on
shape on three levels. First is the evidentiary utilization of shape,52 in which
the purpose of shape is to provide evidence of race consciousness. 3 Assuming the supremacy of the predominant factor test, and given the difficulties of
disentangling sometimes competing and often mutually reinforcing legislative
motives, shape becomes the paramount "objective" evidence of racial influence.54 As a consequence, the predominant factor and bizarre shape tests
become indistinguishable from one another as a practical matter.
49. Id. at916.
50. See Shaw IL 517 U.S. 899, 901-18 (1996) (revealing Chief Justice Rehnquist's
suspicion of race);Miller, 515 U.S. at 927 (stating that "[a]s a nation, we share the obligation
and the aspiration" to end racism).
51. See Samuel Issacharoff & Thomas C. Goldstein, Identifying the Harm in Racial
Gerrymandering Claims, 1 MICE. J.RACE &L. 47, 50 (1996) (reflecting "widely held view that
it is Justice O'Connor's vote that will carry the day"). For a thoughtful reason for rejecting this
mode of thinking, see Kim Forde-Mazrui, The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral
AffirmativeAction, 88 GEo. L.. 2331,2337 & n.21 (2000).
52. See John Hart Ely, Genymanders: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 50 STAN. L.

REv. 607, 614 (1998) (claiming that bizarre shape test is only relevant to Constitution as
"evidentiary reference").
53. As we will discuss below, for Justice O'Connor and perhaps Justice Rehnquist, shape
triggers the application of the Fourteenth Amendment in addition to providing evidence of race
consciousness. This is an obviously important distinction as Justice O'Connor's understanding
of the Fourteenth Amendment's purpose within the context of voting rights permits racre consciousness, whereas her right-of-center colleagues' understanding does not
54. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915-17 (1995) (approving district court's

reliance on shape as important indicator of racial gerrymandering).
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Second, Justice O'Connor's emphasis on shape must be understood as a
compromise between her commitment to the colorblindness ideal and a real-

ist's view of Southern politics, specifically in terms of the impact of
racism - both as past history and present-day reality, particularly in the form
of racial bloc voting - on political practices. Foremost among these realist
concerns is her respect for the VRA as a legitimate exercise of congressional
power and as an effective remedy for racial inequality in politics. Justice
O'Connor articulated these concerns in Bush v. Vera." In that case, she
declared her commitment to an understanding of the VRA, in particular the
more controversial 1982 amendments, as both a legitimate exercise of congressional power under the Reconstruction Amendments56 and as an effective
remedy for both past and present racial discrimination.57
Indeed, the VRA is reputed to be the most successful civil rights legislation ever enacted by the United States Congress. 8 When Congress enacted
the VRA, there were fewer than 100 black elected officials in the then-seven

targeted southern states and fewer than 300 nationwide. 9 By January 1990

there were 3394 black elected officials in the targeted states and 7370 nationwide.' Of course, the eradication of discriminatory voting practices such as

literacy tests and poll taxes contributed to the increase in the number of black
55. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952,990 (1996) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that
"compliance with the results test of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) is a compelling state

interest").
56. See Vera, 517 U.S. at 991-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The Supremacy Clause
obliges the States to comply with all constitutional exercises of Congress' power... This conclusion [the constitutionality of § 2 of the VRA] is bolstered by concerns of respect for the
authority of Congress under the Reconstruction Amendments."). It is important to underscore
that Justice O'Connor has never stated that the VRA is constitutional. Rather, she has written
that states should continue to assume its constitutionality. Id. at 992 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
57. See id at 995 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting "the reality of racial inequality in
our political system"); Shaw , 509 U.S. 630, 640 (1993) (noting success of VRA).
58. See Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofinan, The VotingftghtsAct and the Second
Reconstruction,in QUIET REVOLUTION IN TBE SOUTH THE IMPACT OF T EVRA 1965-1990,
at 378, 386 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofrnan eds., 1994) (stating that VRA is "perhaps
the single most successful civil rights bill ever passed"); Drew Days Ill, Section 5 and the Role
ofthe JusticeDepartment,in CoNTRovEIasiuMINoRriY VoTiNG 52, 53 (Chandler Davidson
& Bernard Grofinan eds., 1992) (maintaining that VRA "is generally regarded as the most successful piece of federal civil rights legislation ever enacted"); Richard H. Pildes, Book Review,
108 HARV. L. REV. 1359,1360 (1995) (reviewing THEPoIrrics oFRACE: QUIETREVOLUTION
IN THE SOuTH (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofinan eds., 1994) (stating that "the Act is
widely considered by far the most effective federal civil rights statute") (internal quotation
marks omitted).
59. DAVIDA.BOSTIS,JOINTCTR.FORPOL.ECON. STuDiES,BLACKELECTED OFHCIALS:
A STATISTICAL SUMMARY 8-12 (1998).
60. Id.

CHALLENGES TO RACIAL REDISTRICTING

239

elected officials. In addition, elected officials of color have benefitted from
a focus on minority registration and enforcement of civil rights laws. But
perhaps the most direct and decisive contributor to the increase in elected
officials of color, 61
particularly inthe South, has been the creation of majorityminority districts
Most recently, the 1990 round of redistricting resulted in the creation of
an unprecedented number of majority-minority districts. 6 2 As David Epstein
and Sharyn O'Halloran note, "after the 1990's reapportionment, the number
of minority representatives jumped 62 percent, from 24 in the 101st congress
to 39 in the 104th congress."' a After the 1992 elections, there were thirteen
new black representatives. Voters elected all of them in newly drawn majority-minority districts. 4 In addition, many black legislators, because of the
seniority they have acquired in the House of Representatives, are poised to
assume chairmanship and leadership positions in many important committees
in the House should the Democrats regain a majority after the 2002 elections.
As we noted earlier, all of these gains were made possible by the VRA.
The success of the VRA is not lost on Justice O'Connor. From her perspective, however, the Court must temper the pursuit of racial equality with "the
complementary conmiment of [the] Fourteenth Amendment... to eliminat[ing] the unjustified use of racial stereotypes. '65 Thus, Justice O'Connor
repeatedly casts the commitment to racial equality against the commitment to
colorblindness.1 Her focus on shape is the embodiment of her commitment
to the "twin goals" of racial equality and colorblindness.
61. We recognize that increase in minority elected officials is a contestable measure of
success. See, e.g., KATEBUNE TATE, FROM PROTEST TO PoTics: THE NEW BLACK VOTERS
INAMERICAN ELECTIONS 2 (1993) (commenting on effect that election of black officials has on
black society). Ms. Tate stated:
Although the elections of Blacks have led to increases in the numbers of Blacks
holding municipal jobs ... they have not translated into a significantly better way
of life for those Blacks at the bottom of society. Pervasive unemployment, entrenched poverty, sub-inferior schools, and urban decay remain critical problems
within the Black community.
Id.
62. SeeDAVIDLUBLN, THEPAXADoxOFREPRPEsENTATION: RACIALGERRYmAmENG
AND MINoRrrY INTERESTS IN CONmSs 22-30 (1997) (detailing rise in majority-minority districts after 1990 census).
63. David Epstein & Sharyn O'HalloranMajory-MinorityDisfrie ts andthe New Politics
of CongressionalElections, in CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS IN TEE 1990S (Brady et al. Cds.,
forthcoming).
64.
TATE, supranote 61, at 200-01.
65. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952,993 (1996) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
66. See id. at 995 (noting potential for conlict in remedying racial inequality with excessive use of racial classifications). "The VRA requires the States and the courts to take action
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Justice O'Connor's focus on shape is a compromise between the Court's
need to heed the constitutional ideal of colorblind decision-making and the
realization that race consciousness is an inevitable reality of redistricting.67
Hence, Justice O'Connor does not reject colorblindness as a constitutional
imperative as some commentators have argued.6" Indeed, she has explicitly
stated that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments "embody" the colorblind
ideal.69 However, she has also explained that "redistricting differs from other
kinds of state decision making in that the legislature always is aware of race
when it draws district lines, just as it is aware of age, economic status, religious
and political persuasion, and a variety of other demographic factors."7" For
Justice O'Connor, in contrast to her colleagues on both her political left and
right, the issue is not whether colorblindness is a constitutional imperative; the
issue is rather how soonthe Court canmake political practices consistent with
the colorblindness ideal. 1 For her colleagues to her left, the question is irrelevant. For the Justices to her right, the answer is "now." As far as they are concerned, colorblindness is racial equality. For Justice O'Connor, the answer
appears to be "with all deliberate speed." The challenge for Justice O'Connor's race-based voting rights jurisprudence has been to devise a constitutional
theory that permits a modicum of race consciousness while limiting its perceived excesses. Ergo, she focuses on a district's putatively bizarre shape.
The third plane of operationalization is the bizarre shape test itself. The
test with its endemic focus on shape and intent, is offered as the best method
of preventing a hann that is even more damaging than simple race consciousness: the ostentatious display ofrace consciousness run amok. 2 This is what
to remedy the reality of racial inequality in our political system, sometimes necessitating race-

based action, while the Fourteenth Amendment requires us to look with suspicion on the excessive use of racial considerations by the government" Id.; see also id. at 993 ("At the same time
that we combat the symptoms of racial polarization in politics, we must strive to eliminate
unnecessary race-based state action that appears to endorse the disease.").
67. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff& Samuel Issacharoff,Race and Redistricting: Drawing
Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MIca L. REV. 588, 644-45 (1993) (describing
substantive and methodological compromise struck in evaluating districts).
68. See id.at 642; CaroiM. SwainNot "Wrongful"ByAnyMeans: The Court'sDecisions
in the Redistricting Cases,34 Hous.L. REV. 315,316-17 (1997).
69. Shaw , 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993) ("Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial pur-

poses, may balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from the
goal of a political system in which race no longer matters - a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the Nation continues to aspire.").

70.
71.

Id. at646.
See Ely, supra note 52, at 617-18 (discussing Justice O'Connor's opinion that gerry-

mandering claims based on partisanship present non-justiciable claims if brought by major
political parties).
72. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 928 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that
application of bizarreness standard "helps achieve Shaw's basic objective of making extreme
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we refer to as uber-race consciousness. Justice O'Connor thinks that raceinfluenced bizarre districts are in-your-face visual representations of racial
interest as raw political power. 3 Consequently, bizarre shape as a constitutional principle is the constitutionalization ofthat public manifestation and the
constitutional domestication of uber-race.
2. Miller andPredominanceFactor
In Miller v. Johnson, the Court attempted to clarify its earlier Shaw I
ruling."' Instead, the confusion persisted. The reasons are obvious. InMiller,
the Court turned away from Shaw Ts concerns and brought this "analytically
distinct" cause of action within the ambit of traditional equal protection law.
Thus, the Court began to speak of intent and purpose as central to the Shaw
inquiry.75 Ultimately, the Court focused on the "predominant factor" test. On
its face, this new test raises firther difficulties. As we discuss in this Part,
three possible interpretations of this test have developed.
a. Predominanceas OverridingFactor
First, under the conventional reading of this test courts will strike down
a districting plan if race is the predominant factor in the redistricters' minds.
Thus, one may interpret the phrase literally and conclude that this test aims to
divine the dominant purpose out of the myriad purposes of the redistricting
process. This is the case, the critics point out, notwithstanding the fact that,
while unpacking legislative motivation is usually a difficult task, it is significantly more difficult within the context of redistricting. By all accounts, redistricting plans usually are the product of a number of competing and mutually
reinforcing dynamic motivations that sometimes include race.76 The use ofthe
predominant factor test immediately signals a keen understanding of the realiinstances of extreme instances of gerrymandering subject to meaningful review"); Pildes, supra
note 21, at 2507 (stating that "an intent standard is not properly linked at the conceptual level
to the nature of the constitutional harm that the Court's racial-redistricting cases recognize").
73. As John Ely stated, to look at a bizarre district is to ask- "Is
there no length to which
they won't go to help Black people?" Ely, supra note 52, at 615.
74. See generally Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
75. See id. at 913 ("We recognized in Shaw that, outside the districting context, statutes
are subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause not just when they contain

express racial classifications, but also when, though race neutral on their face, they are motivated by a racial purpose or object.").
76. See Aleinikoff& Issacharoff,supra note 67, at 607 ("Redistricting is an area in which
classifications of all kinds - most notably partisan, socioeconomic, racial, and ethnic - are the
lifeblood of the process."); Gelman & King, EnhancingDemocracy, supra note 23, at 542
(listing some motivations of districters including incumbent protection, partisan advantage,
winning general election, avoiding primary election, inclusion of right political contributors,
exclusion of prospective challengers, etc.).
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ties of the redistricting process and the many variables that enter into it. Put
differently, this test recognizes that many factors - including race - must play
a part in the process. Only when race predominates will the plan at issue fail
the constitutional test.
Not surprisingly, members of the Court and commentators alike have
77
severely criticized this conventional reading of the predominant factor test.
The test raises two primary difficulties. John Hart Ely wrote, for example:
Drawing a voting district involves an infinity of choices, each ofwhich is
similarly likely to be influenced by a number of considerations. The
boundaries zig and zag, shuck andjive, sidle like sidewinders. And each
spasm has at least one story ofits own: How in the name ofheaven could
one suppose the whole monstrosity to have a "dominant purpose," unless
it's to accommodate as many little purposes as possible?'
How, in other words, will a court divine whether racial considerations predominated in the drawing of a given district? If we take the test at its word,
this criticism has much to say for itself.
As a matter of internal doctrinal consistency, critics also argue that the
Court has yet to clarify how an individual is harmed when district boundaries
are predominantly influenced by racial considerations.79 To be sure, Shaw Ts
doctrine explicitly gives rise to a political right "analytically distinct" from the
rights the Court recognized in pre-Shaw I decisions. That is, Shaw I is not
concerned with traditional voting rights violations, such as withholding the
right to vote, vote dilution, or violations of the "one person, one vote" principle, and political gerrymandering." However, the Court does not say what
exactly this right is. Until it does, the criticisms will continue.8 "
b. Predominanceas Evidence of Race Consciousness
Second, we could understand the predominant factor test as a strictly evidentiary inquiry. It asks, rather simply: 'TWhat is the evidence that the legisla77.

See Ely, supra note 52, at 61; Pildes, supra note 21, at 2537-47 (exploring negative

aspects of predominant factor test).
78. Ely, supra note 52, at 612.

79. See Lssacharoff& Goldstein, supra note 21, at 49-50; Karlan, supra note 21, at 735
(criticizing the Court's "inability to articulate and identify a concrete harm").
80. See Milierv. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,929 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (maintaining
that court failed to indicate what injury plaintiff sustained); id. at 938-39 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (summarizing earlier reapportionment cases).
81. Or they will shift ground. That is, one may sensibly argue that the individual rights
model is ill fiting to this area of the law. See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes,
Expressive Theories ofLaw: A GeneralRestatement,148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000); Richard
H. Pildes, Two Conceptions ofRights in Cases Involving Political 'Rights,"34 Hous. L. REV.

323, 329-32 (1997) (questioning whether individual rights are proper justification for Court's
decisions in reapportionment cases).

CHALLENGES TO RACIAL REDISTRICTNG

243

tare intended to create a majority-minority district?" On this reading, it does
not matter that the legislature also intended to satisfy other, perhaps even competing, purposes." It only matters that race played a role in the drawing ofthe
district. Inthis way, we could understand this reading ofthe test as a traditional
equal protection argument; once the intentional utilization ofrace is uncovered,
state action must be subjectto strict constitutional scrutiny. Fromthis perspective, the claims borne out of haw I are not analytically distinct after all.
Just to be clear, even though both Justice O'Connor and her right-ofcenter colleagues use the terms "predominant factor" and "subordinat[ing]
traditional race-neutral criteria," they do not mean the same thing. As Justice
Thomas explained, when a "legislature affirmatively undertakes to create a

majority-minority district... race-neutral districting principles are necessarily
subordinated [to race]," and the legislature has classified the individual on the

basis of race. 3 In contrast Justice O'Connor actually examines the contours
of a contested district's boundaries and tries to extract the motivation behind

those contours." For Justice Thomas, Shaw Iis a relic ofthe past, a first pass
at what appeared to be a very difficult constitutional inquiry. For Justice
O'Connor, conversely, the doctrinal language is to be taken seriously.
c. Predominanceas NakedPreference
A final way of classifying the harm in Shaw I through Miller'stest is to
interpret the predominant factor test as a prohibition against the unjustified
naked transfer of political power from one racial group to another.3 5 The best

attempt to make sense out of constitutionalizing colorblindness from that
perspective is John Hart Ely's Standingto ChallengePro-MinorityGerrymanders. 6 Ely argued that the intentional creation of majority-minority districts
82. Indoctrinal legal terms, the predominant factor test, as interpreted from the perspective of the right-of-center jurists, is synonymous with the preponderance of the evidence
standard of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The inquiry is whether it is more likely than
not that race was a motivating factor in the legislature's decision to create the district. If so,
strict scrutiny applies, if not, strict scrutiny does not apply.
concurring).
83. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952,1001 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
84. See id. at 960-61 (discussing motivation behind drawing districts).
85. See Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1689, 1689 (1984) (decrying "the distribution of resources or opportunities to one group rather
than another solely on the ground that those favored have exercised the raw political power to
obtain what they want"). This point can also be recast as a variant of Weschler's criticism that
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), violates the principle of neutrality by
preferencing the associational rights of blacks over those of whites. See Herbert Weschler,
Toward NeutralPrinciples of ConstitutionalLaw,73 HARV.L. REV. 1, 34 (1959) (arguing that
forced desegregation violates freedom of association and harms whites).
86. John Hart Ely, Standing to Challenge Pro-MinoritY Genymanders, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 576 (1997).
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harms white voters because in these districts, assuming racial bloc voting,
whites will be unable to elect one of their own: a white representative. According to Ely, just as black voters "gain some psychic satisfaction from being
represented by someone... whom they regard as one of their own," so do
white voters." To intentionally deprive white voters of this "security" or to
so disadvantage them is a constitutionally relevant harm."
The most obvious rejoinder to Ely is that the Court has rejected precisely
this - racial - method of thinking about representation. 9 The problem with
race-influenced districting, the Court explained, is that the resulting districts
"convey the message that political identity is, or should be, predominantly
racial."190 Put differently, they "reinfore ... the perception that members of
the same racial group - regardless oftheir age, education, economic status, or
the community in which they live - think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls."'" As such, we learned
in Shaw Ithat race-influenced districts must be subject to strict scrutiny and
will thus seldom receive judicial approval.
Doctrinally, therefore, the predominant factor test is a constitutional
remedy without atheory ofharm, unless race consciousness itself(or uber-race
consciousness) is the harm. And if race consciousness itself is the harm, then
the predominant factor test is limited only by practical - some would argue
insurmountable - considerations of divining racial considerations from other
considerations. Nevertheless, atthe very least race consciousness (or uber-race
consciousness) as harm would possess the virtue of doctrinal coherence.
B. The DoctrinalFate of the Shaw/Miller Test
In light of the previous discussion, a conscientious judge faces many
doctrinal questions and possibilities. To name a few: Is bizarre district shape
the touchstone ofa Shaw violation? Alternatively, is the inquiryhere analogous
to the constitutional inquiry under traditional equalprotection case law?' If so,
then, is race a permissible redistricting principle? In other words, how much of
the discretion traditionally left at the hands of state redistricters remains? For
possible answers, we lookto Bush v. Veras andHuntv. Cromartie.
87.
88.
wish).

Id at 589-90.
See id. (asserting that all voters have right to choose their candidate on any basis they

89. See generally Samuel Issacharoff& Pamela S. Karlan, Standing andMisunderstandingin VotingRights Law, 111 HARV. L.REV. 2276 (1998).
90. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952,980 (1996).
91.
Shawl, 509 U.S. 630,647 (1993).
92. SeeArlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dcv., 429 U.S. 252, 270 (1977) (holding plain-

tiff must prove intent to discriminate to establish equal protection claim).
93. 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
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1. Bush v. Vera and the PredominanceofRace
The question in Bush v. Vera was relatively simple: Did race predominate in the creation of the challenged districts? Vera thus presented the Court
with its first opportunity to clarify its doctrinal position. Vera, however,
raised still more questions.
The Court's plurality opinion, authored by Justice O'Connor, began
rather curiously. It first looked to Shaw I and explained that a challenged
district must be subject to strict scrutiny review "where 'redistricting legislation.
is so extremely irregular on its face that it rationally can be viewed
only as an effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting, without regard
for traditional districting principles."' 94 Yet, in this same sentence, the
plurality explained that strict scrutiny also applies "where 'race for its own
sake, and not other districting principles, was the legislature's dominant and
controlling rationale in drawing its district lines,' and 'the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles.. . to racial considerations."' 95 This is to say that both Shaw I and Miller present constitutionally
relevant principles. This is hardly an encouraging beginning.
The plurality then turned to the crux of the matter. As it explained, race
consciousness alone will not subject the challenged districts to strict scrutiny
review.' Thus courts will spare an intentionally created majority-minority
district from strict scrutiny, without more. In order for the Court to take its
most drastic step, theplurality explained, a state actor's district must go beyond
mere race consciousness. Those challenging a district on equal protection
grounds must demonstrate that the redistricters subordinated traditional redistricting principles to raceY In other words, strict scrutiny will apply when race
is "'the predominant factor motivating the legislature's [redistricting] decision."' 9 Hence, in the plurality's view, Miller appeared to trump Shaw 1; the
predominant factor test supercedes the bizarreness test.
When the plurality turned to the facts in question, this initial conclusion
proved to be much too facile. Three facts stood out. First, the plurality
focused on the irregular shape and non-compact nature of the challenged districts. 99- This finding led the plurality to conclude that the districts failed to
comport with traditional redistricting principles. Second, the plurality remarked that the Texas legislature considered race when drawing these dis94.

95.
96.
97.

Vera, 517 U.S. at 958 (citingShawI,509 U.S. at 642).
Id.(citing Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,913,916 (1995)).
Id at 959.
Id.

98. Id. (citingMiller, 515 U.S. at 916).
99. See id. (rejecting appellant's argument that bizarre shape was based on traditional
redistricting principles).
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tricts, as evidenced by the preclearance exchange between the legislature and
the Justice Department."° Clearly, the State had intended to create majorityminority districts. Finally, the plurality was persuaded that race had played
a predominant role due to the "unprecedentedly detailed racial data" at the
State's disposal."' On the strength of these facts, the Court concluded that
strict scrutiny was the proper constitutional test.
The plurality in Vera thus signaled the preeminence ofMiller's predominant factor test. It is as part of this general constitutional inquiry that we must
understand Shaw rs bizarre shape test. In other words, race predominates in
the creating of a districting plan when, inter alia, the challenged district is
bizarrely shaped. It appears, then, that a district's shape plays a secondary role
under Miller's test. Or so we thought.
2. Hunt v. Cromartie and Shaw's Allure
The Courthad a secondpass atthis issue inHuntv.Cromartie(Cromartie
1),10 albeit under a different procedural posture. In CromartieI, the plaintiffs
challenged North Carolina's redrawn District 12 - successfully challenged in
Shaw Iand f- on the grounds that the district is the product of"an unconstitutional racial gerrymander."' 0 3 The district court granted the plaintiffi' motion
for summary judgment concluding that the 1997 redistricting plan evidenced
the State's intent to racially gerrymander the 12th District.1 4 Justice Thomas,
writing for the Court, reversed the district court's decision on procedural
grounds, holding that the case was resolved prematurely because there were
disputed issues of material fact. 5 The opinion demonstrates how the Court
intends to deal with the limitations ofthe intent standard and how it intends to
blend both the predominant factor and bizarre shape tests.
First, CromartieI illustrates the Court's commitment to the intent standard announced in Miller' and applied in Shaw ff o7 As part of the Court's
continued attempt to locate wrongful districting cases within its traditional
equal protection jurisprudence, the Court stated that its "decisions have established that all laws that classify citizens on the basis of race, including racially
100. See id. at 969-70 (detailing use of racial terms in preclearance plan).
101. Id. at 962.
102. 526 U.S. 541 (1999).
103. Cromartie , 526 U.S. 541,543 (1999).
104. Id. at 545.
105. Id. at 549-53.
106. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (stating that plaintiff must prove race
was predominant motivating factor in redistricting to state claim).
107. Shaw I,517 U.S. 899,905 (1996) (applying test articulated in Miller).
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gerrymandered districting schemes, are constitutionally suspect and must be
strictly scrutinized."" ° The Court further noted that when "racial classifications are explicit, no inquiry into legislative purpose is necessary."'" However, a "facially neutral law... warrants strict scrutiny only if it can be proved
that the law was 'motivated by a racial purpose or object"'1 0 or "it is 'unexplainable on grounds other than race.'"'
The conclusion is inescapable:
Discriminatory intent matters.
Second, CromartieI also illustrates the continuing importance of a district's shape. Even thoughthe State improved the new District 12's geographic
compactness, 2 the Court was not impressed with the new district's shape. The
Court remarked that the district "retains its basic 'snakelike' shape and continues to track Interstate 85.""' In this vein, it is important to underscore the
importance of geographic compactness for the Court, even for those members
who are committed to the intent standard announced inMiller. Here is why.
In Cromartie , the plaintiffs primarily relied on two types of evidence
in their motion for summary judgment: demographic evidence and bizarre
shape. As the Court conceded, the plaintiffs did not have any direct evidence
of racial motivation." 4 Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the expert
testimony of defendants' expert Dr. David Peterson essentially nullified the
plaintiffs' demographic evidence. The Court nevertheless concluded approvingly that "[v]iewed in toto, appellees' evidence tends to support an inference
that the State drew its district lines with an impermissible racial motive - even
though they presented no direct evidence of intent.""' The crucial fact for the
Court, even at this admittedly preliminary stage, was the district's lack of
geographic compactness. Thus, even though the Court repeatedly has stated
that geographic compactness is not constitutionally required,11 6 geographic
compactness has in effect become a de facto constitutional requirement.
108. Cromartie 1, 526 U.S. at 546.
109. Id.
110. Id. (quotingMiller, 515 U.S. at 913).
111. Id. (quoting Shaw , 509 U.S. 630, 644 (1993)).
112. As demonstrated by comparing Tables 1,2 and 3, infra, the new District 12 splits only
one precinct, sii counties as opposed to ten, is shorter, wider, contains less than 70% its original
population, and only 41.6% of its original geographic area.
113. Cromartie ,526 U.S. 541,544 (1999).
114. M at 547.
115. Id.at548-49.
116. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 978 (1996) (recognizing and professing to
adhere to Court's "longstanding recognition of the importance in our federal system of each
State's sovereign interest in implementing its redistricting plan"); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S.
900, 915 (1995) ("Electoral districting is a most difficult subject for legislatures, and so the
States must have discretion to exercise the political judgment necessary to balance competing
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Perhaps more important, however, is the Court's use of a district's shape
to compensate for the shortcomings of the intent standard. As highlighted by
the various dissents and commentators, CromartieI brings to light an important and potentially fatal shortcoming: The intent standard does not have a
logical stopping point. In this case, the Court used shape to limit the expansive application of the intent standard. An examination of the manner in
which the Court treats the fact that District 12 is a majority-white district in
CromartieIbest illustrates this point.
One of the underlying issues presented by CromartieI is whether the
Shaw/Miller doctrine applies to majority-white districts. This was the first
time the Court was faced with this question post-Shaw L In the post-Shaw I
era, the overwhelming majority of academic commentators assumed that the
Court's "analytically distinct" doctrine applied onlyto bizarre majority-minority diStriCS.117 Following Miller, and certainly after Shaw I, the Court expanded the set of congressional plans subject to the Shaw/Miller doctrine by
explaining that this doctrine applied to all intentionally race conscious majority-minority districts. The assumption nevertheless remained that majoritywhite districts were not subject to strict scrutiny under the Shaw/Miller doctrine."8 In fact, all ofthe congressional districts thatthe Courthas struck down
under the Shaw/Miller doctrine have been majority-minority districts. Indeed
this is one ofthe primary, and perhaps most biting, criticisms ofthe doctrine." 9
CromarieI rendered this criticism invalid. Rather remarkably, Justice
Thomas's opinion makes nothing of the fact that District 12 is a majoritywhite district. Although the Court noted in passing that African Americans
no longer constitute the majority of residents in the district, 20 the Court did
not view this fact as relevant to the equal protection analysis. Moreover, the
Court appeared to be unfazed by the consequences of subjecting districts that

are in fact majority-white to strict scrutiny.
interests."); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1,27 (1975) ("[R]eapportionment is primarilythe duty
and responsibility of the State."). But see Vera, 517 U.S. at 1038 (Stevens, 3., dissenting)
(mourning Court's intrusive stance in Vera, which has thus "guaranteed that federal courts 'will
have a hand - and perhaps the only hand - in the 'abrasive task of drawing district lines'"
(citing Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 553 (1969) (White, 3., dissenting))).
117. See Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 67, at 616,619-20; Pildes & Niemi, supra
note 16, at 498-99.
118. As we argue below, this is the only sensible position in light of Justice O'Connor's
position. In other words, the "expressive harms" inquiry becomes incoherent if applied to dis-

tricts with a minority population of under 50%. See infra Part IVB.I.
119.

See, e.g., Karlan,supra note 46, at 309-10.

120.

Cromartie , 526 U.S. 541, 544 (1999) (commenting that "[b]y any measure, Blacks

no longer constitute a majority ofDistrict 12").
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One unfortunate consequence of this extreme commitment to the intent
standard is that all congressional districts with significant populations of color
are subject to challenge under the Shaw/Miller doctrine. This observation is
particularly alarmin in view of the fact that parties primarily challenge
districting plans for political reasons. This then leaves to the district courts
the Solomonic task of extricating political motivation from racial motivation,
two highly correlated concepts.
There is some evidence in CromartieI that the Court anticipated this
problem and attempted to limit the expansiveness of the intent standard by
relying upon the bizarre shape test. As the Court stated:
[The fact that African Americans] constitute even a supermajority in one
congressional district while amounting to less than a plurality in a neighboring district will not, by itself, suffice to prove that a jurisdiction was
motivated by race in drawing its district lines when the evidence shows a
high correlation between race and party preference.
Ofcourse, neither appellees nor the District Court relied exclusively on
appellees' boundary segment evidence, and appellees submitted other
evidence tending to show that the General Assembly was motivated by
racial considerations in drawing District
12 - most notably; District 12's
2
shape and its lack of compactness.1 1
In light of this observation, one wonders whether Miller did in fact
change Shaw Ts prescription that a district is not subject to strict scrutiny
unless the district is both bizarre and race conscious. The Court seemed
inclined to presume that a district's bizarre shape ipso facto indicates an
impermissible racial motivation. The majority's cryptic exchange with Justice
Stevens on whether bizarre shape is more probative of racial, as opposed to
political, motivation drives this point home. The Court stated:
Justice Stevens asserts that proof of a district's "bizarre configuration"
gives rise equally to an inference that its architects were motivated by
politics orrace.... Wedonotnecessarilyquarrelwiththepropositionthat
a district's unusual shape can give rise to an inference ofpolitical motivation. But we doubt that a bizarre shape equally supports apolitical inference and a racial one. Some districts, we have said are "so highly irregular
that [they] rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort
to 'segregate ... voters' on the basis of race.'
Note first that the Court, through Justice Thomas, conceded to the dissent that
bizarre shape can give rise to an inference of both a political motivation and
a racial motivation. The majority, however, rejected Justice Stevens's conclu121.
122.

Id. at 551-52,
Id. at 541,547 &n.3.
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sion that when evidence of political motivation coexists with evidence of
racial motivation, the evidence rests in equipoise and the Court cannot draw
any meaningful conclusions therefrom. At the very least, the majority seemed
to imply that the conclusion of racial motivation depends upon the extent of
the district's bizarreness. However, it would be plausible to conclude from
Justice Thomas's remark that a district's bizarre shape is sufficient to subject
the district to strict scrutiny, irrespective of how bizarre the shape or the
existence of other constitutionally legitimate considerations.
In view of CromartieI and to a lesser extent Vera, a district's shape
remains relevant to the constitutional inquiry notwithstanding the Court's
retreat to the more familiar confines of the intent standard. In light of the
continued importance of a district's shape, it is important to inquire into the
states' latitude in designing plans in accordance with their traditional state
policies." In Reynolds v. Sims Justice Warren explained "reapportionment
is primarily a matter for legislative consideration and determination, and that
judicial relief becomes appropriate only when a legislature fails to reapportion
according to federal constitutional requisites in a timely fashion after having
had an adequate opportunity to do so.'
In this vein, a necessary question
arises: What exactly are the traditional districting principles that states may
follow when enacting their own redistricting plans? This inquiry is pertinent
because of what it tells us about the issue of redistricting vis-a-vis the Court's
constitutional obligation. We are also interested in these principles because of
the way in which they illuminate the recent racial gerrymandering controversy.
In Reynolds, the Court offered a number of possibilities. For example:
"A State may legitimately desire to maintain the integrity of various political
subdivisions, insofar as possible, and provide for compact districts of contiguous territory in designing a legislative apportionment scheme." 26 Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion in Shaw, reflecting the analysis in Reynolds, referred to "traditional districting principles such as compactness, contiguity,
123. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 978 (1996) (recognizing, and professing to
adhere to, Court's "longstanding recognition of the importance in our federal system of each
State's sovereign interest in implementing its redistricting plan"); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S.
900, 915 (1995) ("Electoral districting is a most difficult subject for legislatures, and so the
States must have discretion to exercise the political judgment necessary to balance competing
interests."); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1,27 (1975) ("[R]eapportionment is primarily the duty
and responsibility of the State."). But see Vera, 517 U.S. at 1038 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)
(mourning Court's intrusive stance in Vera, which has thus "guaranteed that federal courts Will
have a hand - and perhaps the only hand - in the 'abrasive task of drawing district lines"'
(citing Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542,553 (1969) (White, J.,
dissenting))).
124.
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
125. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,586 (1964).
126. Id. at 578.
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and respect for political subdivisions.""' Earlier reapportionment cases also
refer approvingly to the principle of political incumbency. 1" Finally, the
Court also seemed to recognize shape among these principles, going as far as
including language that seems to elevate this districting reality to the realm of
constitutional mandate." The Court seems willing to accept all these principles as constitutionally permissible, and this list is not necessarily exhaus1 30
tive.
The prominent function these principles play in recent decisions begs
what turns out to be a rather simple question: Are these principles constitu-

tionally required?131 In other words, must jurisdictions adhere to these redistricting principles in order to pass constitutional scrutiny? The answer is
clear: They are not constitutionally required." Why then does the perception

127. Shaw , 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993). These principles, while beyond the scope of our
effort, are extensively discussed elsewhere. See, e.g., BRUCE A. CAIN, THE REAPPORTIONMENT
PuzzLE 33-77 (1984); Robert (. Dixon, Jr., Fair Criteriaand Proceduresfor Establishing
LegislativeDistricts,in RE SENTATIONAND REDI-TPICTINGISSUES 7,16-17 (Grofman et al.
eds., 1982); Bernard Grofman, CriteriaforDistricting:A SocialSciencePerspective,33 UCLA
L.REV. 77 (1985); Richard MorrillA Geographer'sPerspective,in POLTCAL GERRYMANDERING AND ThE COuRTS 212, 214-19 (Grofinan ed., 1990).
128. See, e.g, White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783,793-97 (1973); CGffhey v. Cummings, 412
U.S. 735,751-54,752 n.18 (1973); see also Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73,89 n.16 (1966)
("The fact that district boundaries may have been drawn in a way that minimizes the number of
contests between present incumbents does not in and of itself establish invidiousness."). In fight
of the most recent racial gerrymandering cases, the question of whether protecting political
incumbents qualifies as a constitutional imperative in need ofjudicial protection, or a practice
that at least may be among those traditional redistricting principles, is an imperative one. See,
e.g., Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1334-35 (S. D. Tex. 1994). For discussions of the
effectiveness of redistricting in protecting incumbents, see LARRY M. SCHWAB, THE IMPACT OF
CONGRESSIONAL REAPPORTIONMENT AND REDISTRICTING 153-62 (1988) (concluding that
redistricting "is not an important factor in the success or failure of incumbents in most eections"); Charles Bullock, Redistricting and CongressionalStabilit, 1962-72, 37 . POL. 569

(1975) (concluding that redistricting has very small impact in reelection of incumbents).
129. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952,980 (1996) ("Significant deviations from traditional
districting principles, such as... bizarre shape... cause constitutional harm insofar as they
convey the message that political identity is, or should be, predominantly racial."); Shaw 1, 509
U.S. at 647 ("[R]eapportionment is one area in which appearances do matter."). But see Vera
517 U.S. at 999 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Districts not drawn for impermissible reasons or
according to impermissible criteria may take any shape, even a bizarre one."); Miller v. Johnson,
515 U.S. 900, 912 (1995) (downplaying view that "a district must be bizarre on its face before
there is a constitutional violation").
130. See Grofinan,supranote 127, at 174 (Table 1, infra).
131. See Shaw , 509 U.S. 630, 676 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Does the Constitution impose a requirement of contiguity or compactness on how the States may draw their
electoral districts?").
132. Both the majority in Shaw I and Justice Stevens, in dissent, agree with this view. See
Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 647 ("[These criteria are. important not because they are constitutionally
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exist that courts must apply these principles? Why the perceived need for
contiguity, compactness, and the like? At the state level, we suspect that the
force of tradition fuels the use of these principles. When under redistricting
attack, however, the calculus changes dramatically. Inthe racialgerrymandering context, for example, the Court explained that these principles play a role
because they are "objective factors that may serve to defeat a claim that a
district has been gerrymandered on racial lines."'33 They are thus evidentiary
tools, nothing more.' Again Cromartieis useful.
Unlike the districts at issue in Vera, where the State of Texas admitted
that it intended to draw majority-minority districts, the Cromartieplaintiffs
had no direct evidence of racial motivation. 3 The plaintiffs could offer only
circumstantial evidence limited to size, shape, and compactness to prove a
racial classification. 36 Indeed, the plaintiffs' primary evidence focused on an
examination of segments of the district's borderlines themselves and an
inquiry into the reasons for extending the border into one direction as opposed
to another. 131 Instructively, although the Court reversed the district court's
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the ground that the ruling was premature, Justice Thomas, writing for the majority and a proponent of the colorblindness school, nevertheless commented that "[v]iewed in toto, [the plaintiffs'] evidence tends to support an inference that the State drew its district
racial motive - even though they presented no
lines with an impermissible
38
direct evidence of intent.'
required - they are not."); id.at 677 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("There is no independent constitutional requirement of compactness or contiguity.").
133. Id. at 647; see also Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 978 (1996) ("States... may avoid
strict scrutiny altogether by respecting their own traditional districting principles."). But see
Grofinan, supra note 127, at 170-71 ("[S]trict adherence to formal criteria such as equal
population and compactness cannot be relied upon to prevent gerrymandering, and acceptance
of plans simply because they have low deviations or are highly compact may merely act as a
cloak of legitimacy to hide sophisticated gerrymandering from judicial scrutiny."); Daniel H.
Lowenstein & Jonathan Steinberg, The Questfor Legislative Districtingin the Public Interest
Elusive or llusory?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1, 22 (1985) ("[T]here is no basis for the assumption
that oddly shaped districts are signs of "gerrymandering,' given that term's usual negative
connotation.").
134. When a state's reapportionment plan is challenged in court, the plaintiff carries the
burden of proving her case. If the plaintiff is successful, the burden then shifts to the state,
which may then point to its traditional districting principles in operation as a pseudo "affirmative defense." See Mller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (describing plaintiff's burden
in redistricting case).
135. See Cromartie , 526 U.S. 541, 545 (1999).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See id. at 548-49.
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In contrast, in their concurrences in Vera, both Justices Thomas and
Kennedy noted that shape is less important, perhaps even irrelevant, when
there is direct evidence of racial motivation. Thus, Justice Thomas explained
that the fact that Texas admitted that "itintentionally created majority-minority districts and that those districts would not have existed but for its affinnative use of racial demographics," was sufficient to trigger the application of
strict scrutiny.'3 9 Justice Kennedy similarly remarked "we would no doubt
apply strict scrutiny if a State decreed that certain districts had to be at least
50 percent white, and our analysis should be no different ifthe State so favors
minority races."1 4 Shape will continue to occupy a primary evidentiary place
as long as plaintiffs continue to challenge the least compact majority-minority
districts and until state legislatures learn - as the State of North Carolina in
Cromartie I apparently had - that they cannot admit that they intended to
create majority-minority districts. States must either draw compact districts
and hope that Justice O'Connor is true to her word, 1 ' mask their intent by
pursuing political or community-of-interest districts, or cease creating majorityminority districts altogether except where their redistricting schemes would
result in a violation of Section 2 of the VRA.
Soon after Shaw I,the Court moved away from that case's specific concerns and towards traditional equal protection grounds.'42 Despite this purported retreat from bizarreness as a constitutional principle, the Court's
subsequent voting rights decisions, in particular Vera 4 ' and the more recent
CromartieI,1 make clear that the bizarre shape test is still a constitutionally
relevant principle. However, the question remains as to what to make of the
fact that the district at issue has a minority population of less than 50%.
Should the Court alter the constitutional analysis in any way?

139. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952,1002 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring).
concurring).
140. Id. at 996 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (outlining framework for states' consider141. See id. at 993 (O'Connor, J.,
ation of race in redistricting).
142. See generally Richard Briffault, Race and Representation After Miller v. Johnson,
1995 U. CHL LEGAL F. 23 (1995) (considering decisions in vote dilution and racially motivated
districting cases); Pamela S. Kadan, Still Hazy After All These Years: Voting Rights in the
Post-ShawEra, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 287,301 (1995-96).
concurring) (stating that bizarreness is still
143. See Vera, 517 U.S. at 980 (O'Connor, J.,
relevant constitutional principle because "[s]ignificant deviations from traditional districting
principles, such as bizarre shape and noncomlactness... cause constitutional harm insofar as
they convey the message that political identity is, or should be, predominantly racial").
144. Cromartie , 526 U.S. 541 (1999).
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C. Influence DistrictsandEqualProtectionLaw: CromartielI
Given the traditional doctrinal trend and Miller's shepherding of Shaw
I claims within the larger equal protection fold, we look here to the implications of CromartieH and majority-white districts. What does it mean to think
of Miller as a case in which a court is trying to divine predominant racial
motive, especially in a majority-white district?
In Miller, the Supreme Court made clear that the constitutional benchmark under the Equal Protection Clause proscribes the "predominant use" of
race when drawing district lines. On this language, racial awareness is a
permissible redistricting consideration; only those times when the use of race
reaches predominant status must the Court strike down the district in question
on equal protection grounds. This language hardly forecloses the constitutional inquiry; it merely begins it.
For example, in looking for guidance in Justice O'Connor's opinion in
Shaw I, a district court may wonder whether a district must be bizarre on its
face in order for race to predominate. Alternatively, state actors may conclude
that they can constitutionally draw a facially non-bizarre district even if racial
considerations predominate. Following the Court's language in Shaw I, challenged districts must have a majority of minority residents within its borders.
Shaw makes little sense otherwise. Recall, for example, the Court's worries
that Shaw I-type districts would foster the perception that minorities think
alike, behave alike, and prefer the same candidates at the polls. Nevermindthe
racial realities of Southern politics. 45 Instead, consider the logic ofthe Court's
view when reflected against a redistricting canvass with only 40% black
residents. The perceptions that so worry the Court are less plausible in such a
district. The argument may be that ' t hey won't stop at anything to help Black
folk.' 46 Yet, the fact that voters of color do not compose a majority of the
given district and would not be able to elect representatives of their choice
renders this argument inoperative.
This is not to say, however, that courts have completely discarded Shaw
L In Cromartie11, for example, the district court appears to have followed
Justice O'Connor's analysis. In other words, District 1, the "less bizarre" and
"less irregular" of the two districts under review, and with a black population of 50.27%, is a permissible exercise of legislative politics, whereas
District 12, which the court concluded was both more irregular and more
bizarre, is not constitutional, even though its black population was well under
145.

See Pildes, supra note 58, at 1367-73 (commenting on racial segregation in Southern

politics).
146.

test").

See Ely, supra note 52, and language therein (discussing implications of "bizarreness
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50%."47 Hence, as Justice O'Connor once admonished, "reapportionment is
one area in which appearances do matter.""
In contrast, and following our doctrinal discontent, we may posit a very
strong argument for the view that racial predominance requires at least the
creation of a majority-minority district. Presumably, such a requirement is
implicit, if dormant, within the Shaw I line of cases. On this view, districts
with a minority composition of under 50% - such as Districts 1 and 12 at
issue in Cromai'e H- do not meet Shaw/Miller's constitutional threshold.
The obvious question here is simply, what does it mean to say that race
predominates in the creation of a district when voters of color are not a
majority of the district's population?
Looking to the facts in CromartieH, a finding that race may predominate
in the creation of a 46%-black district - a view that permeates Justice
Thomas's CromarieI opinion 4 9 - would lead to further complications. For
example, if race could be found to predominate in a district with 46% minority
composition, what of a district with 30% minority composition, or 20%? How
far, in other words, is the Court willing to go?
Furthermore, the exquisitely nuanced and painstakingly thorough reviews
of redistricting records from Shaw I onward would raise a host of complicated
and ultimately troubling questions. For example, once we accept the view that
courts may inquire into the predominance of race even within those districts
that fail to achieve a racial majority, we must further assume that the Court is
prepared to challenge any and all redistricting lines (not plans) across the
country in order to purge race from the redistricting equation. Justice
O'Connor has gone on record as saying that this will not happen.'
Yet,
following CromartieHto its logical conclusion, there does not seem to be any
other alternative. To say that race predominates within a majority white district is to say that race predominates in the creation of some lines within the
district, not in the creation of the district as a whole.' As such, invalidation
147. Cromartie I, No. 4-96-CV-104-BO(3), slip op. at 9,26 (E.D.N.C. March 7,2000).
148. Shaw,509 U.S. 630,647 (1993).
149. See, e.g., CromartieI,526 U.S. at 548-49 ("Viewed in toto, appellees' evidence tends
to support an inference that the State drew its district lines with an impermissible racial motive even though they presented no direct evidence of intent").
150.

See Mller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 928-29 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,concurring)

(stating that "application of the court's standard does not throw into doubt the vast majority
of... congressional districts").
151. Put differently, common wisdom presupposes the need for a majority of persons of
color within the district in order for them to be able to select a representative of their choice.
In response, one may argue that, according to some influential estimates, a district need only
be 42% black in order to ensure a safe black seat See generally Charles Cameron et al.,
Do
Majority-Minority Districts Maximize SubstantiveBlack Representation in Congress?, 90 AM
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necessarily means that any and all lines are subject to constitutional attack.

This is not a comforting thought.
For the unpersuaded, a third view remains. Looking at the two districts
under constitutional attack, the numbers alone speak volumes. District 12,
which the district court struck down, is not a majority-minority district. Additionally, District 1, to whichthe district court applied strict scrutiny, is 50.27%
black and also not amajority-minority district.'s2 Hence, these numbers appear

to move the issue of influence districts to the constitutional forefront.15 3 The

first question is simply: What is the North Carolina legislature up to here? In

other words, why create a bizarre district that falls short of majority black
composition? If the legislature's intent was to draw a majority black district,
as inShaw, the bizarre shape of the resulting district makes some sense.
One may argue that the analysis should not change whether one creates
majority-minority districts or influence districts. Seen through the prism of
Shaw, for example, the harm may be considered the same: The state is going

to great lengths to help voters of color at the expense of whites, and therein
lies the constitutional offense. On this view, some courts may still consider
bizarreness the threshold requirement. The district court in CromartieI1is

partial to this view. Similarly, the Millertest also remains unaffected. To the
general argument that one may not intentionally create majority-minority
districts, one may attach the following addendum: The state may not inten-

tionally create influence districts, either. In other words, the standard is the
same. Any evidence of race, from 0 to 100%, demands strict scrutiny review.
Both accounts leave us with a very unsatisfactory conclusion because
Justice O'Connor expressly rejected this result."M Under the preceding analPOL. Sc. REV. 794 (1996). However, for this argument to make any sense, one must first presuppose that those living within the challenged district are familiar with the research published
in the pages of the American PoliticalScience Review (that is, for the expressive harms inquiry
to make sense). Without more, we are unwilling to make that assumption.
152. For reasons discussed infra notes 191-92, District 1 should not be categorized as a
majority-black district. See Kimball Brace et al.,
Does Redistricting Aimed to Help Blacks
Necessaril Help Republicans, 49 J.PoL. 169, 174 n.5 (1987) ("Black population and even
VAP [voting age population] may not translate well into an estimate of strength at the polls
because black registration and turnout are generally different and (usually but not necessarily) lower than that of whites.... Black registration is a good indicia of potential voting

strength.").
153. This is notto say that the question has not arisen before because it has. SeeVoinovich
v.Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 149 (1993) (considering whether Ohio districts violated VRA). It is
to say instead that the Court, when faced with Cromartie if, will be forced to decide the question
on the merits. This is something, to our minds, that Voinovich did not do.
154. Justice O'Connor stated:
I understand the threshold standard the Court adopts - that the "legislature subordinated traditionally race-neutral districting principles . .. to racial consider-
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ysis, the state considers race at its own peril. For this reason, we must assume
that the Supreme Court accepted certiorari in Cromartiefn order to reverse

the lower court decision. More specifically, we must also assume that Justice
O'Connor will join the four dissenters in holding that Shaw-type claims must
involve majority-minority districts. Otherwise, Shaw I and its progeny would
lead to some very troubling conclusions. However, in light of the Court's
general equal protection jurisprudence, we are not optimistic.
ff. The Road to Cromartie II
Redistricters attempting to fulfill their redistricting duties and to comply
with the Equal Protection Clause and the VRA are in a bind. Our aim in this
Part is thus two-fold. First, we wish to expose the factual realities confronting
redistricters and trial courts. Second, we present CromartieH as a specific
example of the factual issues encountered by these institutional actors as they
attempt to make sense of the Court's doctrinal pronouncements. Consequently, this Part is appropriately fact-intensive. We begin by first providing
a short procedural background to Shaw f.
A. North Carolina's1992 Planand Shaw II
After the 1990 reapportionment, North Carolina was entitled to an additional district, its twelfth overall. 55 In response, the General Assembly eventually enacted a redistricting plan, the 1992 Plan, which created two majorityminority districts, District I and District 12.156 Table 1graphically reproduces
these districts. The table shows the districts' total population, the proportion
of each district's population that is white and black, the white voting age
population (VAP), the black voting age population (BVAP), the percentage of
white registered voters, the percent ofblack registered voters, and the percentations," to be a demanding one. To invoke strict scrutiny, a plaintiff must show that
the State has relied on race in substantial disregard of customary and traditional
districting practices. Those practices provide a crucial frame of reference and there-

fore constitute a significant governing principle in cases ofthis kind....
Application of the Court's standard does not throw into doubt the vast majority
of the Nation's 435 congressional districts, where presumably the States have drawn
the boundaries in accordance with their customaiy districting principles. That is so
even though race may well have been considered in the redistricting process. But
application of the Court's standard helps achieve Shaw's basic objective of making
extreme instances ofgeriymandering subject to meaningful judicial review.
Miller, 515 U.S. at 928-29 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
155. Shawl, 509 U.S. 630,633 (1993).
156.

Id.
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age ofvoters who are registered Democrats in each district. Withthe exception
ofthe total population, the table shows everything else as a percentage.
Table 1
1992 Plan's lst & 12th Districts
1st
12th
Population
552,386
552,386
White
41.61
41.80
Black
57.26
56.63
White VAP
45.49
45.21
Black VAP
53.40
53.34
Registered (W)
48.97
45.90
Registered (B)
50.53
53.54
Registered (Dem)
87.13
76.65
Soon after the Justice Department pre-cleared the plan, "several white
citizens and registered voters of the State of North Carolina" challenged the
plan on the legal theory that it was a racial gerrymander in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause." 7 A three-judge panel of the District Court for the
Eastern District of North Carolina dismissed the action, concluding that the
plaintiffs failed to state a constitutional claim. 15 The Supreme Court reversed
in Shaw I stating that the Constitution recognizes the "analytically distinct"
claim that "redistricting legislation that is so bizarre on its face that it is
'unexplainable on grounds other than race, . . . demands the same close
scrutiny that we give other state laws that classify citizens by race."'159 The
Court remanded to the district court for a determination on the merits of the
plaintiffs' claim.160
On remand, Judge Phillips concluded that the "General Assembly of
North Carolina deliberately created two districts, the First and the Twelfth,
that would have narrow, but effective voting majorities of African-American
citizens specifically, intending thereby to give the African-American citizens
of those districts a reasonable opportunity to elect representatives of their
choice."161 The district court noted that the two districts are "highly irregular
157. See Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408, 416, 418 (ED.N.C. 1994) (noting grounds
underlying challenge to North Carolina's redistricting plan).
158. Id. at417.
159. ShawI, 509 U.S. at 644.
160.

Id. at 658.

161.

Hunt, 861 F. Supp. at 473.
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in their shapes and extreme in their lack of geographical compactness as
compared to other districts.62 The court explained, however, that the location ofthe districts and the irregularity ofthe boundary lines were the product
of multiple factors, including the necessity of complying with the one-person
one-vote rule, the need for effective representation for African Americans,
maintaining communities of interest, and incumbency protection. 163
In spite ofthese various factors, which influenced the shape and location
of the districts, the panel nevertheless singled out the state's admitted racial
intent to create two majority-black districts as worthy of special constitutional
consideration. This fact alone led the panel to the conclusion that the districting plans warranted strict scrutiny."M Even so, the district court agreed
with the state's assertion that creating the two majority-minority districts was
necessary to comply with Sections 2 and 5 of the VRA, which the court
agreed was a compelling state interest sufficient to withstand the rigors of
strict scrutiny." In Shaw , the Supreme Court once again disagreed."
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, accepted the trial
court's findings that the General Assembly "'deliberately drew' District 12 so
16
that it would have an effective voting majority of black citizens.""
Chief
Justice Rehnquist observed that the trial court record contained both circumstantial evidence of racial motive and direct evidence ofthe state's purpose."
As to the first, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that '"he District Court had
evidence of the district's shape and demographics. The court observed 'the
obvious fact' that the district's shape is 'highly irregular and geographically
non-compact by any objective standard that can be conceived.' 1 69 Second,
the Court remarked that the "District Court also had direct evidence of the
legislature's objective. The State's submission for preclearance expressly
acknowledged that [its] ... 'overriding purpose was to... create two congres170
sional districts with effective black voting majorities.""1
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See id. at 473-74 (concluding that state motive to create two majority-minority districts constituted prima facie violation of Equal Protection Clause).
165. Id.at474.
166. See Shaw , 517 U.S. 899, 904 (1996) (declining to pass upon majority-black District 1, which plaintiffs also challenged, because none of plaintiffs resided in challenged district
and therefore did not have requisite standing to challenge District 1).
167. Id. at 905.
168. Id. at 905-06.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 906.
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The Court's next task was to apply its legal standard to the trial court's
findings offact. For guidance, the Court looked to Miller. InMiller,the Court
proclaimed the now-familiar pronouncement that strict scrutiny applies if"race
was the predominant factor motivating the legislature's decision to place a
significant number ofvoters within or without a particular district."'' Reiterating Shaw 's distinction between race consciousness, being aware of racial
considerations, and motivation, being motivated by racial considerations, the
Court inMillerissued two general declarations that purported to instruct lower
courts on how to72distinguish between these two cognitive states of awareness
and motivation.
In the first instance, states "must have discretion to exercise the political
judgment necessary to balance competing interests.'W7 3 The Court clearly
stated that federal courts must respect this discretion and that "until a claimant
makes a showing sufficient to support [an] allegation [of racial gerrymandering] the good faith of a state legislature must be presumed.M74 Second, federal
courts, as well as states, mustpayaentionto traditional redistricting criteria. 'T
Presumably in lieu of direct evidence of legislative purpose, a plaintiff can
prevail on a Shaw/Miller claim if she shows that "the legislature subordinated
traditional race-neutral districting principles, including but not limited to
compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions or communities
defined by actual shared interests, to racial considerations."' 76
Putting these declarations aside for the moment, it is true that Shaw II
presented the Court with its second opportunity to apply the predominant
factor test in the context of redistricting. More particularly, Shaw H could
have served as a vehicle for the Court to explore more concretely the relationship between traditional race-neutral criteria and racial motivation. Yet, in
light of the Court's redistricting precedents, Shaw H was an easy call because
it possessed all the hallmarks of a constitutionally imperiled redistricting plan
in the mold of Shaw I.
171.

See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (announcing circumstance necessi-

tating strict scrutiny review).

The Court clearly rejected the prevailing assumption that

bizarreness was a threshold showing to a Shaw violation. Id. at 915. The Court stated: "In
sum, we make clear that parties alleging that a State has assigned voters on the basis of race are
neither confined in their proof to evidence regarding the district's geometry and makeup nor
required to make a threshold showing of bizarreness." Id.
172. See id at 916 (noting difficulty of distinguishing between legislature's knowledge and
motive in creating voting district boundaries).
173. I1 at915.

174.

Id. (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,318-19 (1978)).

175.

Id. at 916.

176.

Id.
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Three salient elements deserve comment. First, the Court had already
concluded in Shaw Ithat District 12 was a bizarrely shaped majority-minority
district. 7"' 7 Second, the Court was convinced that the Justice Department
commandeered the State's redistricting process. 78 Third, and perhaps most
fatally, the Court read the record as replete with direct evidence of the State's79
impetuous determinationto intentionally create two majority-black districts.'
Given these factors, the Court's conclusion was unsurprising: "'[Wie fail to
see how the District Court could have reached any conclusion other than that
race was the predominant factor in drawing [the challenged district]."""0
B. The 1997Plan and the Advent ofCromartie II

On July 3, 1996, and less than a month after the Court struck down
District 12, a group of plaintiffs (the "Cromartieplaintifif") filed suit chal5
lenging District 1,also amajority-blackdistrict, on equal protection grounds.' '
At this point, all of the proceedings were stayed in view of the certain likelihood that the General Assembly would once again redistrict."s The district
court permitted the State to hold the 1996 elections under the 1992 Plan, but
enjoined further use of the plan in future elections.ls" The General Assembly
177. See Shaw II, 517 U.S. 899,905-06 (noting bizarre shape of District 12).
178. Id.at 906.
179. See id. (noting testimony of Oerry Cohen, districting plan's primary draftsman, that
"creating two majority-black districts was the 'principal reason' for creating Districts I and 12").
180. Id. at 906 (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,918 (1995)). The Court stated
that race "was the criterion that, in the State's view, could not be compromised; respecting
communities of interest and protecting Democratic incumbents came into play only after the
race-based decision had been made." Id. at 907. The Court then maintained that District 12
could survive strict scrutiny only if the district was narrowly tailored. Id.at 908. The State had
argued that complying with Sections 2 and 5 ofthe VRA and remedying past discrimination were
compelling state interests. Id. The Court disagreed, noting that, for the purpose of resolving the
suit, the Court would assume that compliance with Section 2 could be a compelling state interest,
but that the facts of the case did not support the contention that North Carolina neither fried to
comply with Section 5 nor attempted to remedy past discrimination. Id. at 915-16. The Court
then held that the District 12 was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to comply with Section 2
because the district did not meet the Gingles requirement of containing a geographically compact
population. Id. at 915-17. In an interesting observation, to which we will return below, the
Court reasoned that the concentration of minority votes that would have given rise to a Section
2 claim does not cover more than 20% ofthe district Id.at 918.
181. See Cromatie I, No. 4-96-CV-104-BO(3), slip op. at 2 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 7, 2000)
(summarizing background and procedural history). Three days later, the Shaw plaintiffs
amended their complaint and added as plaintiffs the Cromartie plaintiffs to the Shaw action.
The same attorney represented both sets of plaintiffs.
182. Id.
183. Id at 3.
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did redistrict, 184 a fact that served as a catalyst for more lawsuits, namely
Crormrtie .
On March 31, 1997, the General Assembly enacted a new congressional
districting plan. 8 The General Assembly's stated purpose in enacting this
new plan was to cure the constitutional defects of the 1992 Plan and to preserve the existing partisan balance in the North Carolina congressional delegation. 86 Curing the constitutional defect, as the General Assembly understood
its role, entailed enacting a plan that would not divide precincts; that would
not divide counties except where necessary to maintain the State's partisan
balance; that would eliminate artificial means of maintaining contiguity; and
that would aggregate communities of interests and citizens with similar needs
in like districts. 8
The State's desire to preserve the existing partisan balance, that is, its
explicit acknowledgment of its intent to engage in political gerrymandering,
highlights the relationship between political and racial gerrymandering. In
order to gain an appreciation of these political factors, all of which played a
crucial role in the enactment of the challenged 1997 Plan, it is necessary to
look at the local context and the political background. By all accounts,
politics in North Carolina are quite polarized. Even though only 34% of the
State's registered voters are registered as Republicans, this statistic belies the
extent of the State's conservatism.8 8 Politically, as withthe rest of the South,
North Carolina is a state that is growing increasingly conservative."8 9 While
political power in North Carolina appears to be temporarily in equipoise, the
State is in the midst of a noticeable shift in political power from the Democrats to the Republicans.
This tension - a rightward trend in the midst of an equal division ofpolitical power- is evident inthe results of North Carolina's House races. Looking
back to the 1992 election, the first election after the 1990 census, Democrats
won eight out of twelve seats. In the 1994 election, Republicans made a
comeback, winning eight out oftwelve seats. The Democrats evened the score
in the 1996 election, capturing six out oftwelve seats. Inthe 1998 election, the
184.

An Act to Divide North Carolina into Twelve Congressional Districts, ch. 11, 1997

N.C. Sess. Law 19.
185. See Cromartie1i, slip op. at 3 (analyzing North Carolina redistricting plan).
186.

Id. at9.

187. Id at 9-10.
188. Paul Gronke & . Matthew Wilson, Competing Redistricting Plans As Evidence of
PoliicalMotives: The North Carolina Case, 27 AM. POL. Q. 147,152 (1999) (stating thatNorth

Carolina "has turned progressively more Republican").
189. Id
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Republicans regained their partisan advantage, capturing seven out of twelve
seats. These facts are graphically represented in Figure 1.
Figure 1
PartisanDivision of CongressionalSeats in N.C. (1973-99)
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The State enacted the 1997 Plan at a time when each party held an equal
number of congressional seats. The 1998 elections were held pursuant to an
interim congressional districting plan enacted by the General Assembly.1" By
legislative enactment, the 1998 Plan ceased to be effective once the Supreme
Court, in CromartieI, reversed the district court's invalidation of the 1997
Plan. Thus, following the Court's decision in CromartieI, the configurations
of North Carolina's congressional districts reverted to the 1997 Plan.
Without question, the 1997 Plan was the result of political compromise.
The necessities forpolitical compromise in North Carolina were manifold. The
North Carolina General Assembly was divided politically between a majorityDemocrat Senate and a majority-Republican House. Thus, state actors needed
a plan that was amenable to both chambers. Also, the State did not wantto cede
control ofthe redistricting process to the district court. Further, the incumbents
from the 1996 congressional elections wanted to retain the core of their districts. Perhaps mostimportantly, following the 1996 elections, in which voters
elected six Democrats and six Republicans to the U.S. House of Representatives from North Carolina, the state legislature wanted to preserve the "six-six"
bipartisan balance.
190. An Act to Divide North Carolina into Twelve Congressional Districts, ch. 2, 1997
N.C. Sess. Law 19 ("1998 Plan").
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The 1997 Plan thus created six Democrat districts and six Republican
districts. The 1997 Plan also included one putative majority-black district,
District 1.191 As is evident from Table 2, the State can categorize District 1
as a majority-black district by only one measure: the percentage of the total
population of the district that is African American.192 Even by that measure,
however, the district is only barely majority-black. Again, Table 2 demonstrates that District 12 is no longer a majority-black district in the General
Assembly's 1992 Plan. Indeed, as Table 2 illustrates, District 12 is solidly
majority-white, particularly if one considers the percentage of the white voting

age population and the percentage of white registered voters - 55.05% and
54.14%, respectively.
Table 2
1997 Plan's 1st & 12th Districts
i1st

Population
White
Black
White VAP
Black VAP
White Reg.
Black Reg.
Dem. Reg.

552,161
48.62
50.27
52.42
46.54
54.55
44.89
86.62

12th
552,043
51.59
46.67
55.05
43.36
54.14
45.58
71.27

The partisan composition of the 1st and 12th Districts reflects much
starker figures. With respect to party identification, as measured by the percent of the districts' residents that are registered as Democrats and Republi-

cans, the 1st and 12th Districts created by the 1997 Plan are less Democratic
thanthe 1st and 12th Districts created bythe 1992 Plan. By comparing Table 1
191. For reasons we discuss supra note 152, District 1 should not be categorized as a
majority-black district In the political science literature, a majority-minority district is a district
in which a candidate of color has at least a 50% chance of being elected. Although there is
considerable debate with respect to the percentage of voters of color that redistricters must
include in the district to provide a realistic chance to elect a candidate of color, the most realistic
models assume that the VAP must at least include 55% voters of color.
192. Although Table 2 provides the total African American population for each district as
well as the total percent of African Americans registered to vote for each district, it is important
to note that the total voting age population is significant For example, in establishing whether
a violation of Section 2 of the VRA has occurred, both the Supreme Court and lower courts
have used the total voting age population. See Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 38 n.4 (1993)
(employing percentages based upon total population); Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 48,
50 (1986) (referring to total voting age population); Romero v. Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418, 142526 & n.13 (9th Cir. 1989) (employing percentages based upon total population).
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and Table 2, we can see the percentages of registered Democrats inDistricts 1
and 12 were 87.13 and 76.65, respectively. Under the 1997 Plan, the percentages of registered Democrats in the 1st and 12th Districts were 86.62 and
71.27, respectively. Nevertheless, both districts remained overwhelmingly
Democratic with over 86% of District l's total population registered as Democrats and over 70% of District 12's total population registered as Democrats.
Even though the General Assembly was able to redistrict, its new plan did
not provide the State with any respite from litigation. In fact, on October 17,
1997, residents of Districts I and 12 again challengedthe General Assembly's
1997 Plan on the very same grounds that they challenged the 1992 Plan - that
both districts were still unconstitutional racial gerrymanders." Both sides
moved for summary judgment."4 A divided three-judge panel granted the
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment with respect to District 12, asserting
that "District 12 was drawn to collect precincts with high racial identification
rather than political identification." 95 The panel also permanently enjoined the
State from conducting any elections under the 1997 Plan."9 The panel denied
the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment with respect to District 1 of the
1997 Plano
On appeal, the State contested the district court's failure to
conduct a trial on the merits.'
As discussed above, the Court, per Justice
Thomas, reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded for a new trial on this issue alone."
1. The Plaintiffs' Case
On remand, the district court conducted a three-day bench trial.2 ° After
finding that racial considerations predominated in the creation of both districts, the district court subjected both the 1st District and the 12th District to
strict scrutiny." 1 The court maintained that the plaintiffs presented "extensive" direct and circumstantial evidence of racial motivation. 2°2 The court
concluded that the combination ofthe plainti' direct and circumstantial evi193.

See Cromartic ILNo. 4-96-CV-104-BX3), slip op. at 3 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 7, 2000)

(summarizing procedural history).
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id.
Cromartie v. Hunt, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1029,1029 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 3,1998).
Id.
Cromariie 1I, slip op. at 4.
Cromartie I, 526 U.S. 541, 546 (1999).
IM
See Cromartic 1I,
No. 4-96-CV-104-BO(3), slip op. at 5 (summarizing procedural

history) (ED.D.C. Mar. 7,2000).
201.
202.

See id. at 19-30 (analyzing Districts 1 and 12 under strictscrutiny standard ofreview).
Id. at 24.

58 WASH. & LE L. REV 227 (2001)
dence of racial motivation necessitated a finding that the 1997 Plan evidenced
the General Assembly's predominant intent to racially gerrymander with
respect to District 12.21
Although the trial court characterized this evidence as direct evidence of
a predominant motive to racially gerrymander District 12, the plaintiffs' proof
was suspect at best.2 .4 The plaintiffs' direct evidence consisted of an electronic mail message from Gerry Cohen, the Director of Bill Drafting and the
person in charge of the technical drawing of the 1997 Plan, to Senator Roy
Asberry Cooper, I, who served as the Democratic Chair of the Senate
Redistricting Committee.' 5 The court focused on the part of the message that
stated:
By shifting areas in Beaufort, Pitt, Craven, and Jones Counties, I [Cohen]
was able to boost the minority percentage in the first district from 48. 1%
to 49.25%. The district was only plurality white, as the white percentage
was 49.67%.
This was all the district could be improved by switching between the
1st and 3rd unless I went into Pasquotank, Perquimans, or Camden. I was
able to make the districtpluralityblackby switching precincts between the
1st and 4th.
I have moved Greensboro Blackcommunityinto the 12th andnow need
to take bout [sic] 60,000 out ofthe 12th. I await your direction on this. 2'
The court also characterized as direct evidence of the State's intent to
racially redistrict the fact that North Carolina's computer system had the
"capacity to identify and apportion voters based on race, and to determine the
exact racial make-up of each district."2" The court concluded that the State
used this technologyto assure that District 12, inparticular, was less than 50%
black "in order for it not to present a prima facie racial gerrymander. "2 ' The
court considered these facts as "extensive direct" evidence of a predominant
racial motivation.2
203. See id.(noting that District 12 was drawn to collectprecincts with high racial identification rather than mere political identification).

204.

Id.

205. Id. at 7.
206. Id.
207. Id. at23.
208. IM at 24. Senator Cooper presumably was under the impression that if the district
were not majority-black, it would not be subject to review under the Shaw/Miller doctrine. Id.
After the plan was created, Senator Cooper argued for its passage before the General Assembly
on the grounds that because the 12th District was not a majority-minority district, it would not

be subject to strict scrutiny and the Shaw/Millerdoctrine. Id.
209.

Id.
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From the trial record, however, it appears that Mr. Cohen had a perfectly
reasonable explanation for his reference to the "Greensboro Black community." The following recounts an exchange at the trial between the plaintiffs'
attorney and Mr. Cohen.
Q. Do you recall on or about February 10, 1997, writing... an email...
to Roy Cooper?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. And in that context, in the last sentence or the last two lines, there is a
reference to the Greensboro Black community?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What wereyoureferringto asthe "Greensboro Black community" when
you wrote that memorandum?
A. Well Senator Cooper had earlier that day orthe previous day told meto
draw a new plan which would eliminate the problem in the prior plan that
Guilford County was in three Congressional Districts, which he said was
not acceptable. And there needed to be no county more than two congressional districts in the state. He asked me to make changes in the plan to
have Guilford only in two congressional districts. My basic instruction
was to include more of the 12th District - excuse me, more of Guilford
County in the 12th District for several different factors.
And the first thing Idid was extend all the way up into Greensboro
including, I think, most oftwo State House Districts and this was actually
one sentence at the end of a longer memorandum that really talked about
theFirst CongressionalDistrict Andbymentioningthe Greensboro Black
community, I talked about the basic part of a larger group in the precincts
that Imoved in. I think Imoved 27 precincts in at that time of which the
Greensboro Black community was about 11 of those 27.
I think the total number [of people] actually moved in[to the 12th
District] ...was about 108,000 of which about 52,000 were Black."' 0

On redirect, Mr. Cooper was asked:
Q. How many precincts were moved when Greensboro was added to
District 12?
A. 29
Q. Of those precincts, how many were majority white?
A. 18
Q. One last question.... Doyouknowaboutwhythe Greensboro precincts
were added to District 12, this particular move we were talking about?
A. So as to not have Guilford County divided into three districts and so as
not to waste Democratic votes in the 6th District since that had been designed as a Republican district Instead use them to improve the Democratic vote in the 12th district
210. Trial Transcript at 523-27, Cromartie II,No. 4-96-CV-104-BO(3), slip
op. (E.D.N.C.
Mar. 7,2000).
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Q. What's the source of your information - that's your belief that that's
why they were moved?
A. Yes.
Q. And why do you believe that?
A. Conversations with Senator Cooper at the time the instructions were
given.
Q. So he did not giveyou an instruction to move the Black community into
District 12?
A.No, he instructed me to move more Guilford Countyprecincts that were
predominately Democratic into District 12.
Q. And for the reasons you just stated?
A. Yes, ma'am.'"
Curiously, the district court did not mention this rebuttal in its opinion.
Although the district court focused on the plaintiffs' "extensive direct" evidence
of racial motivation, 2 the plainiffs' proof consisted almost exclusively of the
districts' racial demographics and alleged bizarre shape.21 3 Because District 12

has prompted more controversy, and because the arguments and demographic
evidence presented at trial equally are applicable to both districts, we will focus
our discussion on District 12. However, when necessary, our discussion will
draw distinctions, both factual and doctrinal, betweenthe two districts.
Table 3
Black Population of District 12: 1997 Plan

County

Total Pop.

Davidson
Forsyth
Guilford
Iredell
Mecklenburg
Rowan

126,677
265,878
347,420
92,931
511,433
110,605

Total Black

Black Pop. in

% Black in

Population

District 12

District 12

12,314
66,102
91,655
14,869
134,468
17,773

9,846
43,105
70,114
9,343
113,442
11,794

80%
65%
76%
63%
84%
66%

Table 3 presents a rather stark racial picture of how each county included
within District 12 is divided along racial lines. Table 3 shows that District 12
is composed of six counties - Davidson, Forsyth, Guilford, Iredell, Mecklenburg, and Rowan - all of which are divided in the 1997 Plan. 4 Table 3
211.

Id.at538-39.

212. Cromartie I1 No. 4-96-CV-104-BO(3), slip op:at 24 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 7,2000).
213. See id. at 5-8 (summarizing testimony ofplaintiffs' witnesses).
214. See il at 10 (discussing general racial composition of District 12). Davidson County
is divided between Districts 6 and 12; Forsyth County between Districts 5 and 12; Guilford
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also shows that District 12 consists of substantial African American populations from each of the six counties. For example, 65% of Forsyth County's
African American population and 84% of Mecklenburg County's African
American population are included in District 12. These details did not escape
the district court's attention.
In fact, the court's opinion in CromartieH focused almost exclusively on
these demographic figures.2" 5 The court particularly underscored the fact that
the district contains over 50% ofthe African American voters of Mecklenburg,
Forsyth, and Guilford counties. 1 6 The remaining three counties - Davidson,
Iredell, and Rowan - "have narrow corridors which pick up as many African
2
Americans as needed for the district to reach its ideal size.' 17
Table 4 summarizes the above facts concerning the counties placed in
District 12 under the 1997 Plan- In general, the facts show that, even though
Forsyth, Guilford, and Mecklenburg counties are 25%, 26%, and 26% African
American, respectively, 73% of the population of Forsyth County that is
included in District 12 is African American. Similarly, although to a lesser
extent, 52% of Guilford and 52% of Mecklenburg's total populations included
in District 12 are of African descent. The district court concluded that these
facts were relevant evidence and probative of the State's racial motivation.2 "8
In other words, the court found that the State intentionally partitioned these
counties along racial lines.219

Table 4

County
Davidson
Forsyth
Guilford
Iredell
Mecklenburg
Rowan

Black Population of Counties in 12th District
%Black
%Black in
%White in
Pop. 12th
Pop. in
12th From
12th From
County
County
County
66,684
10%
15%
84%
59,112
25%
73%
26%
136,057
26%
52%
46%
38,459
16%
24%
75%
218,625
26%
52%
46%
33,106
16%
36%
64%

County between Districts 6 and 12; Iredell County between Districts 10 and 12; Mecklenburg
County between 9 and 12; and Rowan County between 6 and 12.
215. See id. at 10-13 (analyzing voting percentages in District 12 under 1997 Plan).
216. Id. at 10.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 11.
219. Id.

270
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Subsequently, the court conducted a similar analysis with respect to the
cities and towns included and divided by District 12.220 For example, the
court observed that 59.47% of the City of Charlotte's population assigned to
District 12 is African American whereas only 8.12% of Charlotte's population
assigned to neighboring District 9 is African American."' Again, the court
considered this evidence relevant to establishing a racial gerrymander in District 12.2 From this observation, the court concluded that District 12 divides
the City of Charlotte along racial lines.=
However, there was more, at least in the opinion of the district court.
Apparently, the court found the plaintiffs' evidence that the State intentionally
included predominantly African American voting precincts within District 12
and shepherded predominantly white voting precincts to neighboring districts
to be most probative of the General Assembly's racial motivation. 4 The
court maintained that in spite of the availability of a number of surrounding
precincts with high percentages of Democratic registration, the State consistently excluded those precincts in favor of precincts with high African American populations.'
Finally, the court also focused on the irregular shape and lack of compactness of District 12."' The court described the district's southern to
northern progression, its eastward foray into Guilford County, its northern
extension into Forsyth County, and its narrow shape. 7 The court appeared
to be quite influenced by the fact that District 12 - and also District 1 - did
not pass muster when subjected to objective evaluations of compactness,"2
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 11-12.
225. See id.(analyzing precincts immediately surrounding District 12).
226. See id. at 12 (commenting that District has irregular shape and is "barely contiguous
in parts").
227. See id. at 12-13 (describing irregular shape and lack of compactness of District 12).
228. The court is explicitly referring to and self-consciously relying on the measures of
Pildes & Richard G.Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre
compactness developed in Richard I-.
Districts,' and Voting Rights: EvaluatingElection-DistrictAppearancesAfterShaw v. Reno,
92 MICH.L. REV. 483 (1993). In this influential article published after Shaw I, Professors

Pildes and Niemi, among other goals, sought to quantify bizarreness through reliance on
previously established measures of dispersion and perimeter compactness. Id. at 536. In their
article, Pildes and Niemi suggested that a dispersion score of.15 or less could be considered a
low score and thus -would identify a non-compact district. Id. at 564, 565 tbl.3. Similarly, and
alternatively, a perimeter score of 0.05 or less could also identify a non-compact and by definition a bizarre district. Id. Pildes and Niemi, however, were very careful to indicate, repeatedly,
that their cutoff points were "somewhat arbitrary." Id. at 564, 567, 568. Additionally, they
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dispersion,' and perimeter compactness" ° measures.2"' Pildes and Niemi
informally suggested that a "highly irregular" district is one whose dispersion
score is equal to or less than 0.15 and/or whose perimeter score is equal to or
less than 0.053.2 Underthe 1997 Plan, District 12 had a dispersion compactness indicator of 0.109 and a perimeter compactness indicator of 0.041."3 In
light of the fact that District 12 was below Pildes and Niemi's threshold of
compactness, the court concluded:
Thus, itis clearthat even afterthe changes [madetoDistrict 12bythe 1997
Plan], the primary characteristic oftheTwelflhDistrictisits 'incialachipelago,' stretching, bending and weavingto pickup predominantly AfricanAmerican regionswhile avoiding many closer and more obvious regions of
high Democratic registration, but low African-American population'
On this score, a very strong presumption arose about the unconstitutionality
of District 12. The ball was now in the State's court. Reproduced below are
the configurations of the 12th District from the three plans. Figure 2 is a
graphical representation of the 12th District from the 1992 Plan. Figure 3 is
the 12th District under the 1997 Plan. Figure 4 is the 12th District under the
1998 Plan.
noted that the Court's race-based voting rights doctrine does not offer much guidance on the
use, and perhaps even the constitutional relevance, of these scores. Id. at 566 ("Shaw provides
no guidance as to whether a district should be considered 'highly irregular' if it is extreme on
either dimension - dispersion or perimeter - alone or only when these two dimensions are
combined."); see also id. at 563 (commenting that almost all districts in North Carolina "have
perimeters that could be classified as quite, if not extremely irregular").
229. Cromartie H, No. 4-96-CV-104-BO(3), slip op. at 13-14 (E.D.N.C. Mar 7, 2000).
Dispersion compactness represents one method of quantifying the geographic and relative
compactness of a district See Pildes & NiMei, supra note 228, at 554. Dispersion compactness
scores are based on the normative assumption that a circle is the ideal shape for a district. Ia
In other words, as a matter of definition, compactness is defined as a circular district Id. To
calculate the dispersion score, the smallest circle possible that completely encloses the district
is circumscribed around the district. Id. at 554-55. The resulting coefficient is the proportion
of the area of the circle which also is included in the district. IM Dispersion scores range from
1, reflecting a perfectly circular district - the most compact - to 0.0, reflecting a straight line the least compact. Id. at 555; Cromartie H, slip op. at 13 & nA.
230. Perimeter compactness is another method of quantifying the relative compactness of
a given district As with dispersion compactness, perimeter compactness is based on the
assumption that a circular district is the ideal district in terms of compactness. Pildes & Niemi,
supra note 228, at 555. A perimeter score is the ratio of the area of the district to the area of a
circle with the same perimeter. Id.; Cromarfie H,slip op. at 13 & n.5.
231. CromarfieI, slip op. at 13.
232. Pildes &Niemi, supra note 228, at 564,565 tbl.3, 568 tblA.
233.

CromartiefI, slip op. at 14.

234.

IM
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Figure 2
12th District in 1992 Plan

Figure 3
12th Districtin 1997 Plan

Figure 4
12th District in 1998 Plan

CHALLENGES TO RACIAL REDISTRICTING
2. North Carolina'sRebuttal
The plaintiffs' contention that District 12 divided counties, cities, and
precincts along racial lines did not go unchallenged. To be sure, the State
conceded that it was aware of North Carolina's racial demographics when it
promulgatedthe 1997 Plan. In light ofthis fact, however, the State argued that
the twin goals of remedying the district's constitutional defects" 5 and creating
a predominantly Democratic district guided the creation ofthe 12th District. 6
It is worth focusing on the redistricters' first goal and their understanding
of the Supreme Court's racial districting doctrine. First, it is clear that the

doctrinal ambiguities described in Part I of this Article guided state officials
in charge of the redistricting process in North Carolina. The record offers
much evidence on this point. For example, Senator Cooper testified:
Well, I read the opinion in Shaw versus Hunt, and the first thing that we
needed to do was to cure the constitutional defects in the 1992 Plan. So that
was the first consideration. And I thinkingeneral that meant making the plan
look a lot nicer, and secondly, to make7 certain that race was not the predominate factor in drawing the districts.2

It is significant to note that Senator Cooper understood the Court's racial districting doctrine to contain two commands: First, the district had to "look

nice;" second, race must not predominate. The testimony quoted above was
not atypical. Senator Cooper, who was the primary architect ofthe 1997 Plan,
testified a number of times that his understanding of the Court's command
235. In an affidavit, Senator Cooper testified:
My responsibility as Chairman of the Senate Redistricting Committee was to attempt to
develop a new congressional plan that would cure the constitutional defects in the prior
plan, and that would have the support of a majority of the members of the Senate, which
was controlled by the Democrats, and the support of a majority of the members ofthe
House, which was controlled by the Republicans.
Jurisdictional Statement at 81a, Cromartie II No. 4-96-CV-104-BO(3), slip op. (EJDN.C. Mar.
7, 2000); see also id. at 82a-83a ("We had two goals for the plan as a whole. The first goal was
to cure the constitutional defects in the prior plan by assuring that race was not the predominate
factor in constructing any district in the plan and to assure that traditional redistricting criteria
were not subordinated to race.").
236. The defendants stated:
Partisan voting patterns, especially Democratic voting strength drove the redistricting
process in District 12. Although the summary report for each plan included racial
percentages, there was never any intent to reach a particular racial percentage. In
addition, although Representative McMahan was looking primarily at election and
registration data, he would pass along the racial percentage to African-Americans in the
House when he was trying to gauge their support for the plan in the House. The overriding concern was to create a Democratic district.
Id. at 21Oa-211a.
237. Trial Transcript at 334, Cromartie I No. 4-96-CV-104-BO(3), slip op. (E.DN.C.
Mar. 7,2000).
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was to make "sure that race was not the predominate factor and making sure
[the district] looked nice.""rn
Second, just as the Supreme Court relied upon the bizarre shape test to
give theoretical content to the predominant factor test, the state actors in
North Carolina also relied uponthe bizarre shape testto give practicalcontent
to the predominant factor test. Both the Supreme Court and the state actors
in North Carolina blended the two tests symbiotically. Senator Cooper stated
his representative definition of a "nice" district as follows:
And inmaking the districts look a lot nicer, we needed to make sure we didn't
split precincts, try to split fewer counties, make sure you didn't have one
county with three members of Congress. Making sure you didn't have long
narrow corridors where you didn't have any people. Making sure you didn't
havethe double-crossovers andcrossovers andpoint
contiguity and all ofthese
9
concerns that were pointed out by the court.2
Once again, Senator Cooper's testimony is instructive:
[The] primary concern was to address, as I've testified earlier, the constitutional problems that were cited by the Supreme Court inShawv. Hunt,so that
turnedus to the 12th Congressional Districts [sic] becausethatspecificallywas
the district that was unconstitutional. The Court had real problems with the
long narrow corridors without people, splitting of precincts, point contiguity,
crossovers, double-crossovers.
We set out to eliminate all of those problems that they had specifically
pointedoutinthe decision. And alsowewantedtomakecertainthatracewasnot
the predominate factor, which is what the Court said that we could not do. w
The third observation, which directly relates to the second, is that these
state officials were not really sure what racial predominance truly meant. For
example, in Senator Cooper's testimony quoted above, notice how the concept of racial predominance was almost an obligatory add-on or afterthought.
In this context, the concept of racial predominance is almost a legal shibboleth.
There is, however, some evidence in the record that the Court's predominant factor test communicated one message to the North Carolina state officials. Specifically, the state officials understood the Court's predominance
standard to mean that, as long as they did not require fixed racial percentages
or racial quotas, they would not run afoul of the Court's command that race
not predominate in the redistricting process. On direct examination, Senator
Cooper was asked whether he and the Committee attempted to achieve a set
racial percentage in the 12th District. He answered:
238.

Id. at342,358.

239.
240.

Id.at 334; see also Jurisdictional Statement at 83a-84a, Cromartie I, slip op.
Jurisdictional Statement at 102a-103a, Cromartie I, slip op.; see also Trial Transcript

at 349-50, Cromartie 11, slip op. (noting testimony of Representative McMahan concerning

importance of drawing compact 1st District).

CHALLENGES TO RACIAL REDISTRICTING
No, we were not. I would say that the fact that... the number did go up [the
numberofAfricanAmericansinDistrict 12],thatwasflnewithmeandthatwas
fine with a lot ofpeople who wanted to support Congressman Watt and wanted
tomakecertainthattherewasincumbentprotection,butthatwasnottheprimary
motive by far. And we did not have a set percentage that we were looking
for
241
specificallybecause the Court told us not to do that, so we didn't do that.
Similarly, state officials in North Carolina appeared convinced that the
Court's predominant factor test was not applicable to districts that were not
majority-minority districts. Both Senator Cooper and Representative McMahan argued to their respective chambers that District 12 was constitutional
because it was not a majority-minority district.242 In contrast, the trial court
was convinced that North Carolina created "a new 12th District with just
under a majority-minority in order for it not to present a prima facie racial
2
gerrymander. 1 4
With respect to its second goal for the 1997 Plan, the State maintained
that, other than remedying the constitutional defects of the 1992 Plan, the
State's predominant motive was to maintain the six-six bipartisan division in
the State's congressional delegation. 2' Preserving the bipartisan division
essentially entailed protecting the incumbents of both parties 245 and preserving
the partisan core of each of the twelve districts. 2' Because both the 12th and
241. Trial Transcript at 357, Croma?e 11, slip op.
242. Id.at 442,469-72.
243. Cromartie IL No. 4-96-CV-104-BO(3), slip. op. at 24 (E.D.N.C. (Mar. 7, 2000).
Even though the state argued that it did not intentionally keep the African-American population
in District 12 under 50% of the District's total population, Jurisdictional Statement at 128a129a, Cromartie II, No. 4-96-CV-104-BO(3), slip op. (E.D.N.C. Mar. 7, 2000), the trial court
remained quite skeptical notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiffs did not present any evidence
on that score except for the numbers themselves. Cromarte II, slip. op. at 24 & n.9.
244. Jurisdictional Statement at 207a, Cromartie ff, slip op. ("Maintaining the six-six
partisan balance of the state's congressional delegation was the most important goal in drawing
the 1997 Plan.").
245. The State maintained:
Another important consideration was protecting all twelve incumbents. Senator Cooper
at one time or another spoke to all incumbents, and Representative McMahan talked with
several incumbents or their representatives.... Some of the particular efforts made to
protect the incumbents included the following. Each incumbent was put in his or her
own district (except Congresswoman Sue Myrick who, at the time, resided in the same
neighborhood and census block as Congressman Mel Watt) and each district was
designed to favor the political party ofthe incumbent
Id.
246. The Defendants stated:
One aspect of protecting incumbents was preserving the territorial, constituent and
partisan cores of each district. For Congressman Hefner, all of his home county of
Cabarrus was included in his district In addition, the House had initially looked at
running District 12 from Charlotte to Fayetteville, which would have had a significant
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the 1st Districts had Democratic incumbents, the redistricters sought to preserve the Democratic core of both.
The plaintiffs did not directly dispute the State's contention that political
gerrymandering was one of its motivations. Instead, the plaintiffs sought to
showthat inthe pursuit ofapolitical and/or racial gerrymander, North Carolina
unconstitutionally redrew its congressional districts merely by relying upon
racial demographic data. The defendants' attempted a two-pronged rebuttal of
the plaintiffs' evidence.
First the defendants attempted to discredit the plaintiffs' evidence, in particular the plaintiffs' proofthat the State included within District 12 precincts
with large African American populations and excluded precincts with high
Democratic registration. More specifically, the defendants countered that voter
registration data are not an accurate predictor ofactual voting behaviorinNorth
Carolina. Table 5 graphically summarizes the State's first argument.
Table 5
Partisan Registration of County Segments in
District 12
County
Davidson
Davidson
Forsyth
Forsyth
Guilford
Guilford
Iredell
Iredell
Mecklenburg
Mecklenburg
Rowan
Rowan

Dist.

%
Reg.
Dem.

%Dem.
Lieutenant
Gov. 1988

12
6
12
5
12
6
12
10
12
9
12
6

55.57
51.94
88.08
55.88
78.69
56.59
65.83
59.67
77.73
48.29
68.09
50.68

40.90
39.05
78.65
42.62
68.72
45.67
45.71
37.03
65.66
39.06
57.34
38.73

%Dem
Court Of
Appeals
1988
40.29
38.07
81.31
41.22
67.39
39.38
44.90
39.47
65.25
31.07
56.78
35.99

% Dem
U.S. Senate
1990
36.89
30.41
82.76
40.19
68.84
43.27
49.05
36.37
74.74
48.17
54.00
32.25

effect on Hefier's and other Democratic districts. In deference to the Senate's wishes
and acknowledging the need to preserve Hefier's district, the House backed off its proposal. The House also accepted the Charlotte to Greensboro route not only to preserve
a Democratic district for Mel Watt, but because going anywhere else would disrupt the
Republican districts bordering District 12. Congressmen Burr and Ballenger were interested in having two counties switched between their districts (as best recalled, Davie and
Yadkin) asthe 1997 Plan was being negotiated.
Id. at208a.

CHALLENGES TO RACIAL REDISTRICTING
Table 5 demonstrates why Democrat registration is not an accurate predictor of probability of voting for Democrat candidates. The columns represent the following categories from left to right: the counties; the districts in
which the counties are located; the percentage of voters that are registered
Democrats by corresponding county and precinct; and the percentage ofvoters
who voted for the Democrat candidate in the 1988 Lieutenant Governor
election, the 1988 Court of Appeals election, and 1992 United States Senate
election, respectively.
Table 5 makes two important things clear. First, for every county segment, the percentage of voters who actually voted in favor of the Democratic
candidate2 47 in the three elections was significantly less than the percentage
of voters who were registered Democrats. For example, Davidson County is
split by the 1997 Plan between Districts 12 and 6. The percentage of registered Democrats is roughly equivalent in both counties: 55.57% in Davidson
12 and 51.94% in Davidson 6. However, in both Davidson 12 and Davidson
6, the Democratic candidate fared worse than expected using the registration
data as the baseline. In Davison 12, the Democratic candidates received
40.90%, 40.29%, and 36.89% of the votes, much less than the 55.57% expected from the registration data. Similarly, in Davidson 6, the Democratic
candidates received 39.05%, 3 8.07%, and 30.41% of the vote, much less than
the 51.94% expected.
The second observation relates to the second prong of the State's defense. The State soughtto show that, contraryto the plaintiffs' assertions, the
precincts included within the boundaries of District 12 were the highest
performing Democrat precincts in the relevant geographic area. Table 5
certainly supports that proposition. Comparing the county segments included
within District 12 to those excluded from District 12, one can see that the
included segments voted for the Democrat candidate more consistently than
the excluded segments.2' For example, 68.09% of Rowan 12's population
were registered Democrats. In the three elections used as baselines in Table
5, the Democrat candidates received 57.34%, 56.78%, and 54% of the vote.
In Rowan 6, 50.68% of the voters were registered Democrats and the Democrat candidates received 38.73%, 35.99%, and 32.25 % of the vote.
In addition to the data in Table 5, the State presented the testimony
of its expert, Dr. David Peterson. Dr. Peterson testified that political gerrymandering was at least as plausible an explanation for District 12's configuration as racial gerrymandering. Dr. Peterson presented '"boundary seg247. This variable is measured by the percent of voters who voted in favor of the Democratic candidate in the 1988 court of appeals election and the 1990 United States Senate elections.
248. The exception to this trend is Davidson County. Neither Davidson 6 nor Davidson
12 are high performing Democrat segments.
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ment"249 evidence to support the State's contention that race did not predominate in the drawing of the district's boundary lines." ° He testified in part as
follows:
Iftheboundaryofthe 12thDistrictweredrawnwiththepurposeofcollecting Blacks inside it, one would expect as one travels alongtheboundaryto
find consistently that Blacks are more heavily represented inside the
boundary than outside. In contrast, if the boundary were drawn with the
purpose of collecting Democrats into the 12th District, one would expect
as one travels along the boundary to find consistently that Democrats are
more heavily represented inside the boundary than outside.
What I found in my study traversing the boundary of the 12th District
is that most ofthe time Blacks are represented more heavily inside the line
than out, about 80 percent of the time. I also found that Democrats are
represented more heavily inside than out, also about 80 percent ofthe time.
And so the evidence is equally supportive ofboth hypothesis [sic], that is
to saythetwo are statistically indistinguishable. Inparticular, neither one
dominates the other."
Therefore, the State concluded that the plaintiffi could not establish the predominance of race.
3. The Trial Court'sDecision
The State's evidence that District 12 was not the product of a racial
gerrymander did not persuade the trial court to rule in the State's favor. The
court, relying upon the plaintiffs' expert Dr. Weber, concluded that "Dr.
Peterson's boundary segment analysis [is] non-traditional, " "unreliable" and
"not relevant."' 2 The court relied upon the plaintiffs' evidence, summarized
in Table 3 and Table 4 that cities and counties were split along racial lines in
the construction of the 12th District. Thus, even though the State presented
evidence, summarized in Table 5, that the 12th District is composed of highperforming Democrat precincts containing the region's most reliable Democrats, who happen to be African Americans, the court was not persuaded. The
court concluded that it "is clear that the Twelfih District was drawn to collect3
precincts with high racial identification rather than political identification."12
249. Boundary segments "are those sections along the district's perimeter that separate
outside precincts from inside precincts. [T]he boundary segment is the district borderline itsel
for each segment, the relevant comparison is between the inside precinct that touches the
segment and the corresponding outside precinct" Cromartie , 526 U.S. 541,548 n.5 (1999).
250. Trial Transcript at 486, Cromartie , No. 4-96-CV-104-BO(3), slip op. (E.D~N.C.

Mar. 7,2000).
251.
252.
253.

Id. at486-87.
Cromartie II, No. 4-96-CV-104-BO(3), slip op. at 23 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 7,2000).
Id. at 24.

CHALLENVGES TO RACIAL REDISTRICTING
The trial court also found that racial considerations predominated in the
construction of the 1st District. In particular, the court emphasized that
Senator Cooper and the redistricting committee maintained that in order to
comply with Section 2 of the VRA, the 1st District's total African American
population needed to be over 50%.4 Thus, the State created a district with
a total African American population of 50.27%.
The court then subjected the 12th District to strict scrutiny. The court
concluded that the State had not presented sufficient evidence of a compelling
state interest. Moreover, the court noted that even if such an interest did exist,
the 12th District was not narrowly tailored. 25 Consequently, the court concluded that the "1997 Plan's District 12 is an impermissible and unconstitutional racial gerrymander in violation of the Equal Protection Clause."' 2 6
In contrast to the fate of District 12, the court upheld the constitutionality
of District 1. First, the court noted that complying with the VRA is a sufficient compelling state interest. Second, the State narrowly tailored District
I's borders to satisfy the three Gingles preconditions: geographical compactness, political cohesiveness, and racial bloc voting.2 7 Consequently, the court
concluded that even though race was the predominant factor in the district's
composition, the State satisfied the compelling state interest and narrow tailoring prongs of the analysis.
it. Racial Genymanderingas PoliticalConstraint
InPart I, we discussed the confusing doctrinal landscape that redistricters
and lower courts must navigate." 8 In Part II, we offered CromartieH as a
representative example ofthe evidentiary actualities that district courts face.2 59
In this Part, we consider why the district court's opinion in CromartieII is
flawed and why the Supreme Court should reverse the district court's ruling.
In so doing, we provide the empirical predicate for our suggestion in Part IV
that racial gerrymandering claims should be governed by a looser standard
° Our chief complaint in this
such as that announced in Davis v. Bandemer.260
254. Id. at 26; see also Jurisdictional Statement at 130a, Cromartie ILNo. 4-96-CV-104BO(3), slip op. (E.D.N.C. Mar. 7,2000) (discussing racial composition of District 1 necessary
to meet VRA mandates).
255. Cromartie H, slip op. at 25 (noting that District 12 could not survive strict scrutiny
review).
256. Id.
257. CromartieI, slip op. at 27.
258. See supra Part I (discussing doctrine of districting).
259. See supra Part II (analyzing Cromartie11).
260. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 143 (1986) (holding that threshold showing
of discriminatory vote dilution is required for prima facie case of equal protection violation in
political gerrymandering cases).
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Part is that the lower court, and the Supreme Court for that matter, misunderstands the relationship between race and politics.
In general, though we ourselves are somewhat skeptical of the claim, we
are willing to assume arguendo that the use of race at issue in the wrongful
districting cases is troubling in a constitutionally relevant way. However, the
empirical research we present in this Part shows that there is an important
trade-off between political and racial gerrymandering that serves as a constraint on racial gerrymandering. This view leads us to the conclusion, which
we develop in Part IV, that the Court need not micromanage the process as it
unsuccessfully attempted to do inthe last decennial apportionment.26 1 Perhaps
more importantly, our own research leads us to the conclusion that political
gerrymandering, not racial gerrymandering, is the best explanation for the
composition of Districts 12 and 1 at issue in Cromartie .
A. Race over Politics
We begin with the basics. As we pore over the voluminous record of the
Cromartielitigation, one fact stands out among all others: Incumbents played
a key role in ensuring easier electoral campaigns for themselves. This is not a
surprising development, of course, for not only is incumbency protection part
and parcel ofthe political process, 262 it also isa legitimate state interest. 3 The
racial gerrymandering
cases are replete with evidence of exactly this form of
influence.264

261. See infra PartIV.
262. See David Lublin & D. Stephen Voss, The PartisanImpact of Voting Rights Law:
A Reply to PamelaS. Karlan, 50 STAN. L. REV. 765, 773 (1998) (arguing that best method to

avoid successful challenges to district lines is for state legislatures to use incumbency as their
principal criteria when drawing district boundaries).
263. See White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 793-97 (1973) (upholding districting plan based
on protection of congressional incumbents, which state legislature deemed to be "important
interest" of state); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 751-54, 752 n.18 (1973) (noting that
political considerations are inevitable and essential parts of districting and apportionment
process); Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 89 n.16 (1966) (stating that drawing district
boundaries in such manner as to minimize contests between incumbents is not inherently invidious).
264. See Shaw 11, 517 U.S. 899,936 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 942 (1995)
(Ginsburg, J.,dissenting) (examining particular instances where incumbent state legislators
influenced districting decisions to their own benefit); Shaw , 509 U.S. 630, 673 n.10 (1993)
(White, J.,
dissenting) (noting that protection of Democrat incumbent was primary determinant
in decision to place majority-minority district in northern rather than southern part of state); see
also Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1321 (S.D. Tex. 1994) ("The redistricting process
[in Texas in the early 1990s] became a no holds barred political fight, and fangs were out."
(quoting Ted Lyon, former member of Texas House and Senate with direct involvement in
redistricting controversies of 1980s and 1990s)).

CHALLENGES TO RACIAL REDISTRTCTING
As the statistics we present later in this Part bear out, political incumbency played a key role in the process that produced North Carolina's original
Districts 1 and 12. It also is true that racial considerations played a role.
Racial awareness is inevitable in the redistricting process. 2 65 Thus, the difficult question in Shaw I, if any such question existed, was whether any external
constraints existed on a redistricter's ability to craft a plan of his or her
choice.' Prior to Shaw I, the only "constraint" with any significant bite, if
one chooses to call it that, was the "one person, one vote" principle. Hence,
as far as redistricters were concerned, the political sky was the limit. After all,
this was politics.

Shaw I reinterpreted this understanding of the redistricting process and
its concomitant constitutional limitations. Much criticism has been directed
at the Shaw I opinion."6 We are interested in one specific strand of this
265.

In taking this view, we are aware that it is not universally accepted. See, e.g.,

M.TNOnMo, WHOSEVOTESCOUN?AFEmM

ABIGAIL

TivEACUONANDMINORITYVOTNGRIGHTS

(1987); James F. Blumstein, Racial Gerrymanderingand Vote Dilution: Shaw v. Reno in
DoctrinalContext,26 RUTGMS L.J. 517, 555 (1995) (stating that proposition that race considerations are "nearly always" basis for districting decisions is "probably erroneous"); Katharine
Inglis Butler, Afflirmative RacialGerrymandering: Rhetoric and Reality, 26 CUMB. L. REV.
313, 358-363 (1996) (arguing that districts are and should be assigned on basis of geography
and not group interest). Of note, it is clear that the lower court in Vera reacted strongly to this
very fact. Vera, 861 F. Supp. at 1318-19. The Vera court stated:
If the Legislature intended to allocate voters on the basis of race, [the redistricting
software] certainly provided a readily available, efficient means of doing so. In fact,
because the software constantly displayed racial and ethnic data on the screen anytime an operator used the system, a would-be map drawer would affirmatively have
to ignore the data.
Id. Ignoring racial and ethnic data would be quite hard, the court reasoned, perhaps impossible.
The court continued:
But as Chris Sharman, the principal computer technician/map drawer involved in
Congressional redistricting, testified: The problem is when you draw on this computer, it tells you the population data, racial data. Every time you make a move,
it tabulates right there on the screen. You can't ignore it
Id. at 1319.
We disagree with this view. As James Blumstein has argued, racial awareness is not
enough. While redistricters may be aware of racial data, that fact, standing alone, does not lead
to the conclusion that they in fact took the data into account See Blumstein, supra, at 556
n.224.

266. RIcHAmD H. PaDEs, DIFFUSION OF PoLICALPoWMAND
14-16 (forthcoming).

THE VoTINGRIGHs ACT

267. See, e.g., A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. et al., Shaw v. Reno: A Mirageof GoodIntenlions with DevastatingRacialConsequences,62 FORDHAML. REV. 1593,1644 (1994) (arguing
that focus on shape and appearance of voting districts in Shaw I was misguided considering
history of political racism in North Carolina); Karlan, supra note 142, at 301 (noting that Shaw
Ps precondition that district not have "bizarre" shape provides courts with "roving warrant to
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criticism, and specifically as it relates to the result in Cromartie II: the

Court's holding that racial considerations, and those alone, must be excised
from the redistricting process. This does not make a great deal of sense for
two reasons." First, constitutional support for the proscription of race, and
only race, is simply non-existent. 69 Neither the text nor the intent of its
framers offers much helpY 0
Second, and as exemplified in Part II of this Article, the redistricting
process does not workthe way the Court envisions it. As Daniel Hays Lowenstein wrote, state legislators '"hinkabout politics, including their own individual prospects for reelection or election to higher office, their party's prospects,
and the interests of their constituents and other groups with whom they are
allied." ' Thus, race is part of a larger universe of redistricting considerations. Race is often a very small part of this universe, especially from the
perspective of the incumbent legislator. On this specific point, the facts in
Vera v. Bush prove instructive.
scrutinize districts they do not like"); Frank R. Parker, FactualErrors and Chilling Consequences: A Critique of Shaw v. Reno and Miller v. Johnson, 26 CUME. L. REV. 527, 535-36
(1996) (stating that Shaw I punishes state legislatures for doing very thing Court commanded
them to do in Thornburgv. Gingles); Pildes, supra note 21, at 2539-47 (suggesting that "predominant motive" test in Shaw I does not address specific harms caused and is unworkable in
practice).
268. See Samuel Issacharoff, Racial Genymanderingin a Complex World: A Replv to
JudgeSentelle, 45 CATf. U. L. REv. 1257,1263 (1996) (questioning moral difference between
districts gerrymandered to "afford minorities enhanced representation" and those drawn to
benefit incumbents); Richard H. Pildes, Diffi~on of Political Power and the VR4, 24 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 119 (2000).
269. See KOUssER, COLORBLiND INJuSTICE, supra note 18, at 16-20 (indicating that
Fifteenth Amendment and Enforcement Acts were intended to give blacks same enfranchisement rights as whites).
270. See Jeffrey Rosen, Kiryas Joel and Shaw v. Reno: A Text-Bound Interpretivist
Approach, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 387, 401-06 (1996) (noting that despite conservative justices'
fondness for textual and historical interpretation, they cannot make originalist argument that
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments forbid race-conscious districting); Jed Rubenfeld,
Afflirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 465 (1997) (arguing suspect-class strict scrutiny was
never intended to apply when "no one supposed that there was an ulterior, racially invidious
motive"); Melissa L. Saunders, EqualProtection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness,96
MICH. L. REV. 245,268 (1997) (stating that legislative history of Equal Protection Clause holds
few answers because its framers were not seeking to create coherent legal doctrine, but instead
were attempting to solidify support for it as part of plan central to reconstruction of Union);
Robin West, Toward andAbolitionistInterpretatonof the FourteenthAmendment, 94 W. VA.
L. REV. 111, 131-33 (1991) (arguing that dominant interpretations of Fourteenth Amendment
are incorrect in that original intent of abolitionists was to "protect each citizen against the threat
of both private violence and private violation").
271.
Daniel Hays Lowenstein, You Don't Have to Be Liberalto Hate the Racial GerrymanderingCases, 50 STAN. L. REV. 779,799 (1998).
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During the 1990s round of redistricting, the Democratic Party in Texas
found itself in the enviable position of controlling everything. Governor Ann
Richards was one oftheir own, and both the state House and Senate had clear
Democratic majoritiesY 2 Under such conditions, and without more, the Democrats' redistricting goal was fairly simple. They sought to maximize their
partisan advantage. This may not be virtuous or worthy, but is nonetheless
true. As we now know, the fruits of their efforts were challenged and ultimately struck down on equal protection grounds. Of specific interest is the
following passage in the lower court opinion:
Withregardto District 30, we conclude thatthepolicy ofincumbentprotection, to the extent it motivated the Legislature, was not a countervailing
force againstracialgerrymandering. Instead, racial gerrymanderingwas an
essential part of incumbencyprotection, as African-Americanvoters were
deliberately segregated on account oftheirrace among several Congressional districts.P
As we remarked earlier, the record is replete with evidence that incumbents were overwhelmingly preoccupied, as they often are, with their reelection prospects. They also were aware of racial characteristics at the block
level. 4 Without question, these two considerations played a central role
during the crafting of the redistricting plan. The incumbents' work also was
influenced by the fact that African Americans in Texas side solidly with the
Democratic Party, creating a strong motivation on the part of incumbent
Democrats to include black voters within their districts.
Most observers would agree that it is difficult to disentangle racial
considerations from political considerations." 7 Nevertheless, the lower court
concluded that "the contours of Congressional District 30 are unexplainable
in terms other than race." 6 For the lower court, race came before politics.
This is another way of saying that redistricters in Texas placed minority
272. See Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304,1313 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (describing composition of Texas legislature during 1991 redistricting).
273. Id. at 1339.
274. For the district court, this fact made all the difference in the world. See, e.g., Vera, 861
F. Supp. at 1309 ("This insight, worthy of Orwell's Big Brother, was attainable because computer technology, made available since the last decennial census, superimposed at a touch of the
keyboard block-by-block racial census statistics upon the detailed local maps vital to the redistricting process."); id. at 1318 (stating that critical feature of redistricting software "is that it
allowed the operator to 'split' a [voting precinct] and work on a block-by-block level. Racial/
ethnic breakdown was available on a block level on [the software]. By contrast, no election contest information was available at the block level on the REDAPPL software") (citations omitted).
275.

See SamuelIssacharoff The ConstitutionalContoursofRace andPoliics,1995 SUP.

CT. REV. 45, 54-55 (discussing idea espoused in Shaw and Millerthat race cannot be assumed

detriment of political interest and that racial dimensions of politics are unknown).
276.
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interests ahead of their own. Without more - and the district court offers very
little on this score - this position is simply implausible. It goes against everything we know about redistricting and legislative behavior. Not surprisingly,
nothing we read in the lower court's opinion in Vera leads us to a different
view. What we do see is an attitudinalist discomfort with the redistricting
process and the use of race. The district court simply disliked the process that
led to the districts at issue in Vera. Similarly, the Supreme Court, and Justice
O'Connor in particular, clearly is bothered by the notion that the practice of
race-based districting is not constrained by any limiting principle. As we
demonstrate in the succeeding Parts, political practice and available evidence
suggest this concern is unwarranted.
B. Constraints
The Court's racial districting doctrine is incoherent. Sometimes Shawl
Miller claims are "analytically distinct" voting rights claims. Sometimes they
are garden-variety applications of the Court's traditional equal protection
jurisprudence.2" This lack of clarity is due in part to the fact that the Court
as an institution is agnostic with respect to whether these cases are about race
or whether they are about politics. Our underlying argument in this Part is
that these cases are not about race - they are about politics. In other words,
racial gerrymanders are a species of the genus of political gerrymanders. As
such, the racial gerrymander is subject to the same political constraints as its
cousins, the partisan gerrymander or the incumbent gerrymander. Thus, it is
difficult to justify the judicial micromanagement spawned by Shaw. Instead,
for the Court needs to identify clear but flexible ground rules and to allow the
parties to decide political disputes through the political process. Before
turning to that argument, we first offer support for the view that the political
process, in fact, provides institutional constraints on both political and racial
gerrymanders.
277. In putting the point this way, we wish to underscore our displeasure with the Court's
application of strict scrutiny in the Shaw line of cases. Unlike the more traditional areas of
equal protection law, redistricting law deserves a much more careful approach than the Court

has thus far evinced. Plain and simple, voting is different and the doctrine must reflect these
differences. See Pamela S. Karlan &Daryl J.Levinson, Why Voting Is Different, 84 CALIF. L.
REV. 1201 (1996); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the PoliticalProcess:
The TransformationofVoting Rights Jurisprudence,9 MIcH. L. REV. 1833 (1992) (explaining
that realities of racial bloc voting and rise of "racially defined majority faction" makes voting
rights arena different from other areas of constitutional law); cf. Christopher L. Eisgruber,
Ethnic Segregationby Religion andRace: Reflections on Kiryas Joel and Shaw v. Reno, 26
CUMB. L. REv. 515, 524 n.26 (1995-96) ("A legislative district functions differently from a

town, a school district, or a municipal facility. The district does not govern itself or provide
services. Instead, it is a means by which interests are voiced and counted. It makes sense only
as part of a political process that includes other, differently composed districts.").
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1. PoliticalGenymanderingas Constraint
A number of political considerations constrain redistricters. A host of

often-competing variables influence those in charge of drawing the new
district lines, none of which is likely to dominate the others. Incumbency
protection and partisan advantage serve as two paramount constraints." '
Nevertheless, redistricters also are relatively constrained by "traditional redis-

tricting principles" such as contiguity, compactness, maintaining communities
of interest, and a desire not to split political subdivisions. 9 Furthermore,
certain localized constraints also enter into the redistricting equation, such as
assuring that the right political contributors are included in a district, that
challengers are districted out ofthe district, and thatthe incumbent's offspring

are districted in the right district.280 Another constraint is based upon who
controls the districting process and whether redistricting is partisan or bipartisan." Finally, there also are legal and constitutional constraints, such as
278. See DAVIDBUTLER &BRUCECAmCONRESIONALREDISTPICTING: COMPARATIVE
AND THEORETICALPEPEvCIVBs 102 (1992) (suggesting that redistricting controversy typically
centers on displacement of incumbents and partisan reconstruction of districts); DEWEY M.
CLAYTON,ARICANAmICANANDTHEPOIICSOFCONGgSRSIONALREDISTRImNG133-47
(2000) (detailing established redistricting standards that factor in to any plan, including equality
of population, compactness, respect for political boundaries, contiguity, and communities of
interest); Gelman & King, EnhancingDemocracy, supra note 23, at 541-42 (asserting that
partisan goals of avoiding party primary contests, insuring incumbent victory in general election,
and increasing party representation are key to adequate understanding of redistricting process).
279. See Shaw , 509 U.S. 630,639,642,647,651 (1993) (employing traditional redistricting criteria in evaluation of validity of voting districts). Compactness and contiguity are the two
leading criteria. See Timothy 0. O'Rourke, Shaw v. Reno: The Shape of Things to Come, 26
RUTGERs L. 723, 758-72 (1995) (evaluating districts at issue in Shaw I using traditional
redistricting criteria of continuity, compactness, preserving subdivision boundaries, maintaining
communities of interest, insuring regular-looking districts, and guaranteeing that districts constitute identifiable constituencies); Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, The Third Criterion:
Compactness as a ProceduralSafeguard Against Partisan Genymandering,9 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 301, 310 (1991) (suggesting that there are no "non-neutral" districting criteria
because each criterion always benefits one group over another). This is not to say, to be clear,
that these safeguards, standing alone, are as efficient in ferreting out excessive political self-interest as the Court and commentators make them out to be. See supra note 125 (listing sources);
see also Bernard Grofman, Would Vince LombardiHave Been Right if He Had Said: "When
It Comes to Redistricting,Race Isn 't Everything, It's the Only Thing," 14 CARDOZO L. REV.
1237, 1258 (1993) (arguing that more peculiarly shaped districts in 1990s are not majority-

minority districts).
280. See Gelman& King,EnhancingDemocracysupranote 23, at 542 (noting that incumbency protection involves potentially conflicting goals of attempting to increase party representation in district to enhance likelihood of success in general election while simultaneously
seeking to minimize presence in district of rival factions within party to avoid possible threat

in primary).
281.

Id. at 543.
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compliance with the one-person, one-vote rule, the Fourteenth Amendment
generally, the Fifteenth Amendment's prohibition against vote dilution, and
the VRA 82
Note that we define all of these considerations as constraints. We do so
because these considerations affect the location of a particular district's
boundaries. 3 This leads us to our second point: All of these considerations
compete with one another and require important tradeoffs. The decision to
satisfy one goal necessarily entails sacrificing another goal." An example
will underscore this point.
Without question, a redistricter desires both to protect incumbents and to
maximize her party's electoral advantage. However, both ofthese goals
cannot
be maximized. A desire to maximize incumbency protection would lead to
"packing" as many of the incumbent's partisan supporters in the district as
possible - particularly if the incumbent is extremely risk-averse. 5 Such an
impulse would run counterto the desire to maximize partisan advantage. Maximizing partisan advantage necessitates that partisans be spread out across
districts, thus reducing each incumbent's margins of victory and electoral
cushion." s This is what we refer to as external constraint, when the desire to
maximize one objective is inhibited by the motivation to achieve a separate

goal.
Some tradeoffs are inherent to the particular consideration itself. This is
what we refer to as internal constraints. For example, to the extent that incumbency protection might be a consideration, that goal is itself composed of
competing considerations. Incumbents want to avoid primaries, but they also
want to win by large margins in the general elections. Avoiding primaries
entails assuring that not too many members of the legislator's political party
are included in his or her district. Winning the general election entails the
282. See generally SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL
STRuCTuRE OF THE PoLiTcAL PROCESs (1998).

283. See Morgan Kousser, Reapportionment Wars: Party, Race, and Redistricting in
California, 1971-1992, in RACE AND REDISTRICTING IN THE 1990S, at 134, 186 (Bernard
Grofinan ed., 1998) ("What lessons should we draw from the reapportionment experiences of

the nation's most populous state for three decades? First, constraints matter.").
284.

See Gelman & King, EnhancingDemocracy, supra note 23, at 542 (examining com-

peting goals of protecting individual incumbents and expanding party representation in legislature).
285. See id. (demonstrating that drawing lines to include greater party representation in
district naturally leads to more votes favorable to party in general election).
286. See id. (noting that increased party representation in one district necessarily means
decreased party representation in neighboring district resulting in lower aggregate competition).
The debate over the proper percentage of voters needed to designate a district as having achieved
"safe" status must be situated exactly within this discussion. See infra note 352 and accompanying text.
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exact opposite - assuring that as many partisans are included in the district as
possible. Thus, not only is incumbency protection constrained by external
motivations, it also is internally constrained when the desire to maximize that
consideration demands a trade-off between competing and relatively mutually
incompatible means of accomplishing the same objective.
How then must courts and judicial actors understand the different political motivations that constrain the discretion of districters? According to Gelman and King:
[The key to understanding the effects of redistricting is to view redistricters as trying to achieve consensus among - or impose a solution on incumbents who are operating in an extremely uncertain environment and
attempting to reconcile at least three competing goals: to maximize their
probabilityofwinningoravoidingapartyprimary,towinageneralelection
(conditional on winningtheprimary), andto increasetheirpoliticalparty's
seat advantage. The resulting redistricting plan is usually a compromise,
heavily influenced by numerous formal and informal constraints, which
geneallyweightsthepoliticalparty's overall seatadvantagemostheavily."
This is but a window into what we have come to know as the "pull, haul, and

trade" that is politics.2

2. Three Justificationsfor Majority-MinorityDistficts
Racial gerrymandering also canbe apolitical variable that constrains a redistricter's political motivation. These twin considerations, racial and political
gerrymandering, co-exist in direct tension. Understanding how racial gerrymandering can serve as a constraint on a redistricter's line-drawing discretion
requires an exploration of the justifications for creating majority-minority
districts. A number of important assumptions underlie the creation ofmajorityminority districts. We focus here on three related justifications for drawing
districts in which the majority of citizens are of color.
a. Normative DescriptiveJustification
First, one may justify majority-minority districts as part of a normative
commitment to providing descriptive representation on behalf of voters of
color. One can think of a number of presuppositions that might justify this
normative conclusion. One such presupposition is that salient political characteristics of the polity ought to be descriptively represented in the relevant
representative body. Tothe extentthat race is a salient political characteristic,
it then follows that voters of color ought to be descriptively represented.
Similarly, one also may believe that representative institutions are less legiti287.

Gelman & King, EnhancingDemocracy, supra note 23, at 542.

288.

Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997,1020 (1994).
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mate unless they adequately mirror the physiological characteristics of the
polity. In this case, to the extent that legitimacy is an important value, it would
follow that voters of color ought to be descriptively represented in the relevant
representative institution. Some examples follow.
When members of the Court as well as commentators criticize majorityminority districts because "race for its own sake" is taken into account, their
criticism is directed, though perhaps unintentionally, at the normative assumptions of descriptive representation." 9 The claim that race cannot be taken into
account for its own sake can be translated as saying that descriptive representation is not a normative good. To paraphrase Carol Swain, drawing majorityminority districts simply for the sake ofhaving more brown and "black faces"
is not morally compelling.
Of course, Swain is not the only one who views descriptive representation as a normatively thin justification.29 ' Very few people believe that
descriptive representation is important in and of itself, and we do not make
that argument here. Criticizing descriptive representation on moral grounds
is the intellectual equivalent of playground-bullying; the normative claim for
descriptive racial representation admittedly is more contestable on moral,
philosophical, and constitutional grounds. If it were the sole justification for
drawing majority-minority districts, the Court and commentators would be
rightly alarmed. However, two other justifications exist.
b. Normative Substantive Justification
A second justification for majority-minority districts maybe grounded as
part of a normative commitment to providing substantive representation for
voters of color. As with descriptive representation, one also can present a
number ofpresuppositions that wouldjustify this normative conclusion. How289. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958 (1996); id. at 972-73 ("The record discloses intensive and pervasive use of race both as a proxy... and for its own sake in maximizing the minority population of District 30 regardless of traditional districting principles."); id.
at 993 ("First, so long as they do not subordinate traditional districting criteria to the use of race
for its own sake .... States may intentionally create majority-minority districts.. ."); Miller
v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,913 (1996).
290. CAROL M SwAIN, BLACK FACES, BLACK INTERESTS: THE REPREsENTATION OF
AFRIcANAMICANSiNCONGRESs 5, 189,197-206 (1993); see alsoABIoA]LM. TERNSTROM,
WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MiNoRrY VOTING RIGHrs 239 (1987)
(questioning link between descriptive representation based on particular demographic characteristics and effectiveness of representation of tangible interests of that group).
291. For normative arguments that differences ought to be represented in the political
sphere, see generallyANNEPEHILu, THE POLTICS OF PRESENCE (1995); Carol Gould, Diversity
andDemocracy:RepresentingDifferences,in DEMOCRACY ANDDDFERENCE: CONTESTnNGTRE
BOUNDARIES OF THE PoTIcAL 171 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996); Anne Phillips, Dealingwith
Difference: A PoliticsofIdeas, or a Politicsof Presence?,in DEMOCRACY AN DIFFERENCE:
CONT.STINGTHE BOUNDARmS OF TE POUTICAL 139 (SeylaBenhabib ed., 1996)
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ever, one should be sufficient to provethe point. InRogersv. Lodge, Justice
Stevens stated that even though there is not a constitutional right to proportional representation, "in a representative democracy, meaningful participation
by minority groups in the electoral process is essential to ensure that representative bodies are responsive to the entire electorate." ' Contrast Justice Stevens's statement with Justice Thomas's concurring opinion in Holder v.
Hall,4 a forcefully stated rebuttal to the very idea of substantive racial representation. Justice Thomas wrote:
Underthis theory [substantive racirepresentation], votes that do not controlarepresentative are essentiallywasted; thosewho castthemgounrepresented and arejustas surely disenfranchised as iftheyhadbeenbarred from
registering. Such conclusions, of course, depend upon a certain theory of
the "effective" vote, a theory that is not inherent in the concept of representative democracy itself.
Infact, itshouldbe clearthatthe assumptions thathave guidedthe Court
reflect only one possible understanding of effective exercise of the franchise, anunderstandingbased ontheviewthatvoters are "represented" only
when they choose a delegate who will mirror their views inthe legislative
halls. Butitis certainlypossibleto construct atheory ofeffective political
participationthatwould accord greater importancetovoters' abilitytoinfluence, rather than control, elections. And especially in a two-party system
suchas ours, the influence ofapotential "swing" group ofvoters composing
10% to 20% of the electorate in a given district canbe considerable. Even
such a focus on practical influence, however, is nota necessary component
ofthedefinitionofthe"effective"vote. Some conceptions ofrepresentative
government may primarily emphasize the formal value of the vote as a
mechanism for participation in the electoral process, whether it results in
control of a seat or not Under such a theory, minorities unable to control
elected posts would not be considered essentially without a vote; rather, a
vote duly cast and counted wouldbe deemedjust as "effective" as any other.
If a minority group is unable to control seats, that result may plausibly be
attributed to the inescapable fact that, in a majoritarian system, numerical
minorities lose elections.'s
Justices Stevens and Thomas are engaged in an indirect debate regarding
the normative substantive justifications underlying the construction of majority-minority districts. Justice Stevens presupposed a representative democracy
that is legitimate only if representative institutions are responsive to the electorate generally and to voters of color in particular. Justice Thomas envi292.
293.

458 U.S. 613 (1981).
See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 640 n.21 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (noting

necessity of meaningful minority participation in electoral proess).
294. 512 U.S. 874 (1994).

295. See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874,899-901 (1994) (Thomas, ., concurring) (rebutting
concept of substantive racial representation in drawing voting district boundaries).
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sioned instead a representative democracy where responsiveness is the right
of the majority. Legitimacy is, as a matter of definition, responsiveness to the
interest ofthe majority. In Justice Thomas's constitutional world, the formalistic process of casting a vote and having that vote literally counted easily
meets the constitutional command of "effective participation." On this view,
the franchise has an "instrumental" function, nothing more.
Both worldviews are problematic in some respects, though not equally
so. The complication with Justice Stevens's model and the source of Justice
Thomas's ire is the difficulty of defining and guaranteeing "meaningful participation" to voters of color in representative institutions. Justice Thomas
averred that the "matters the Court has set out to resolve ... are questions of
political philosophy, not questions of law. As such, they are not readily subjected to any judicially manageable standards that can guide courts in attempting to select between competing theories. 2 96 This is a very powerful and
relatively persuasive point. However, Justice Thomas's position also has its
weaknesses, and those weaknesses are more troubling on both moral and
constitutional grounds than the position that Justice Stevens champions.
Justice Thomas noted that if "a minority group is unable to control seats,
that result may plausibly be attributed to the inescapable fact that, in a majoritarian system, numerical minorities lose elections."'
On its face, and as we
asserted above, this position has much to say for itself. However, the fimdamental response and concomitant question for Justice Thomas's position is an
issue that the Court has struggled with since Giles v. Harris.' The question
is whether a judicial and constitutional response is warranted in the face of a
political defeat by people of color, when the explanation that voters of color
are simply political losers is implausible and demonstrably incorrect.
As an institution, the Court has responded in the affirmative. There are
times when it seems that the Court is less committed to the promise that voters
ofcolor are to be guaranteed "meaningful participation" in the political process.
However, the case can nevertheless be made that, historically, the Court has
interpreted the Constitution to guarantee voters of color not only a formalistic
right to cast a ballot, but also an ancillary and arguably necessary concurrent
right to ensure some measure of responsiveness from representative institutions.' Moreover, not only is this commitment reflected in the Constitution,
296. Id. at 901-02.
297. Id. at901.
298. See Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475,488 (1903) (holding thatfederal circuit courtlacked
jurisdiction over equity action to compel local board of registrars to enroll names of black
residents previously excluded from voting list under state constitution alleged to be contrary to
United States Constitution).
299. For a recent and thorough treatment ofthis point, see Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1663 (2000).
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it is also a congressional imperative effected through the aegis of the VRA.
These observations lead us to the third justification for majority-minority
districts.
c. Normative Remedial Justification
A third justification for drawing majority-minority districts is grounded
on remedial grounds. Indeed, this rationale has in fact served as a primary
justification for creating these districts under the VRA. The mechanism used
by the VRA - though somewhat controversial but less so than the descriptive
and substantive justifications noted above - is quite simple: Where white
voters vote as a block as part of a political strategy to frustrate the political
will of voters of color, voters of color are entitled to a redesign of representative institutions provided that voters of color have different substantive interests than do whites and are sufficiently large and geographically compact. 3°°
Let us return thento Justice Thomas's problem in Holderv. Hall. Justice
Thomas complained that the constitutional commitment to guarantee "effective participation" by voters of color in the political process is flawed because
it embroils the judiciary in disputes of political theory for which it is ill
equipped. "° For Justice Thomas, the problem is that there is no theory to tell
judges "about the number of minority districts to create. ''302 Descriptive, substantive, and remedial justifications may inform judges that "members of a
minority are to 3control seats, but not 'how many' seats they should be allowed
0
to controlled.0
Justice Thomas's assumption, which many members of the Court seem
to share, is that political actors left to their own devices will maximize the
number of majority-minority districts, will do so in constitutionally and
cartographically repugnant ways, and cannot effectively be constrained by any
principle unless applied by the Court. On this point the members of the Court
may use as evidence the 1990 round of redistricting in which redistricters
created an unprecedented amount of majority-minority districts with very little
indication that they were constrained in any way.3° Shaw/Miller and the
cases that followed are undoubtedly the Court's constitutional response and
reaction to what it perceived to be a very troubling phenomenon.
300. See Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986) (examining factors to consider
in determination of whether ability of minority voters to elect representatives of their choice has
been impaired).
301. See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874,897-903 (1994) (arguing that questions Court has
attempted to resolve in determining ability of minorities to control elected seats are questions
of political philosophy "beyond the ordinary sphere of federal judges").
302. Id. at 902.
303. Id.
304. See LUBLN, supranote 62, at 22-30 (examining in detail increases in black and latino

majority districts).
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3. PoliticalConstraintson Racial Gerrymandering

On this score, we argue that the Court's reaction is premature at best and
ill-guided at worst. Thus, even though we share Justice Thomas's concern
that the Court unwisely has attempted to micromanage the problem of representation, and while we share his solicitousness for easily applicable judicial
standards, we think that the answer lies in a better understanding of the
political process as opposed to the doctrinal equivalent of a judicial handwashing. The approach Justice Thomas advocates, as is evident in the underlying Cromartielitigation, will lead courts to more, not less, involvement in
the workings ofpolitics. In contrast, the approach we advocate in this Article,
permits redistricters to carry out their duties in the shadow of the Constitution - as opposed to in the shadow of litigation. This is because racial
gerrymandering compels redistricters to engage in substantial trade-offs and
thus serves as a constraint on their discretion. We turn now to that analysis.
We begin by considering the extent to which there is a tradeoff between
racial and political gerrymandering. This investigation should have a significant impact on how the Court understands the role that creating majorityminority districts plays in the actual world of political practices. The literature in the social sciences has treated this point extensively. Political scientists Kimball Brace, Bernard Grofinan, and Lisa Handley most prominently
raised the question in a 1987 inquiry into the relationship between partisan
and racial gerrymandering. 3 5 However, it was not until after the 1990 apportionment that political scientists examined this question in earnest.
In general, the problem is as follows. As African Americans are concentrated into majority-minority districts, their purported influence in surrounding
districts diminishes.3°6 This problem is exacerbated further by the fact that
voters ofcolor, politically liberal voters, are removed from surrounding districts
so that districters maypursuethe construction ofmajority-minority districts, the
surrounding districts increasingly become conservative and elect conservative
representatives. 3" These representatives, having nothing to gain and every
305. See Kimball Brace et al., Does RedisnrfcingAimed to Help Blacks Necessarily Help
Republicans, 49 . POL. 169, 183 (1987) (analyzing South Carolina state senate races to
conclude that creation of majority-minority districts does not aid Republicans where districts
are skillfully gerrymandered, when there is overwhelming Democrat dominance, where white
Democrats replace removed black Democrats, or where Republicans are too inexperienced in
these areas to capitalize on new redistricting plans).
306. See LUBLIN, supra note 62, at 36-37 (recognizing that concentration of black voters
in majority-minority districts limits their ability to influence elections in surrounding majority
white districts); SWAIN, supra note 290, at 197-200 (same).
307. Lublin explained:
Racial redistricting in the South usually harms black substantive representation.
Contrasting regional residential patterns among African Americans and voting preferences among whites explain the differential impact of racial redistricting in the
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thing to lose when considering whether to vote in favor ofpolicies that benefit
voters of color, are more concerned with how their votes will play in their
districts than in enacting policies benefitting voters of color.3 08 At the very
least, these representatives are concerned with enacting conservative 3policies,
9
which some would argue are inimical to the welfare ofvoters of color.
Thus, one of the majoritarian problems that majority-minority districts
attempt to resolve simply are replicated on a different plane, the state and
national legislatures.310 Majority-minority districts may solve the problem of
descriptive representation by enabling voters of color to elect representatives
of their choice, but result in a similar problem in a different context, representatives of color being frustrated at the legislative level.3 '
In particular, many scholars estimate that as a result ofthe 1990 round of
districting, the Republican Party picked up between four to six seats in the
United States House of Representatives in 1992 attributable to the creation of
majority-minority district. 12 For the 1994 election, Lublin estimated that the
Democrats lost an additional two to six seats - in addition to the five to six
seats they lost in 1992, which he estimated they would have retained in
South compared to the North. Individual southern metropolitan areas do not contain
enough blacks to support an entire black district, so racial redistricting usually
requires connecting several urban centers with rural black areas.
in te South, racial redistricting packs black liberal voters into districts and
makes the surrounding districts more white and conservative.
LUBUN,supra note 62, at 93-97.
308. Id. at 91-97.
309. Id.; see Epstein & O'Halloran, supra note 63, at 390-92.
310. See LANI GTrMNE, THE TYRANNY OF TBE MAJORITY 135 (1994) (asserting that
majority-minority districts waste votes of white liberals submerged in surrounding white,
conservative districts and thus increases overall levels of minority disenfranchisement in
legislature); LUBLIN, supra note 62, at 36-37, 114 (recognizing that increase in majorityminority districts dilutes minority voting strength in surrounding districts); Epstein & O'Halloran, supra note 63, at 389-94 (noting that majority-minority districts may simply recreate
problem of racial polarization at legislative assembly level instead of providing voters of color
with substantive political power).
311.

See GU[NE,

supra note 310, at 74 (asserting that "districting ignores the role of

prejudice at the legislative level" because it does not constrain majority representatives "to
represent, reflect, or accommodate minority interests within local legislative decision-making").
Recent empirical work casts doubts on this conclusion. See DAVID T. CANON, RACE, REDISTING, AND REPRESENTATION: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF BLACK MAjORiTY

DIsTRICTs 199 (1999) (concluding that "[tjace matters in the U.S. House of Representatives,

at both the institutional and the individual levels").
312. See LUBUN, supra note 62, at 111-12 (estimating five or six seats); SWAIN, supra note
290, at 232 (estimating "no fewer than five seats"); Kevin A. Hill, Does the Creation of
Majorit yBlackDistricts Aid Republicans? An Anaysis of the 1992 Congressional Elections
in Eight Southern States, 57 J.POL. 384,391 (1995) (estimating four seats).
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1994- as a result ofthe creation ofmajority-minority districts.3 13 From these
scenarios, some have concluded that the use of majority-minority districts to
effect descriptive representative, facilitated by the VRA, has contributed to
the decline of the Democratic Party and thereby resulted in an erosion of
support for substantive policies favoring people of color. 14
These facts are not lost on political actors. At the very least, drawing
majority-minority districts makes sense only if these districts serve as a
mechanism for providing both descriptive representation and substantive
representation for citizens of color, who traditionally have been excluded from
the body politic. The trade-off between political and racial gerrymandering
presents African American, Latino, and Democrat leaders with a tough political choice: They must choose between the substantive electoral interests of
citizens of color and the descriptive electoral interests of voters of color. This
trade-off serves as an important restraint on racial gerrymandering, which was
not quite evident to political actors before the 1990 round of redistricting.
C. EmpiricalAnalysis
The Court's doctrine in the wrongful districting cases suffers from a
failure to appreciate sufficiently the relationship between rae and politics.
The Court's doctrine seems to have drawn two ironclad categories: political
gerrymandering and racial gerrymandering. The admittedly Everest-like standard of Davis315governs the first category, while the still-evolving and admittedly confusing, if not just simply confused, standards of Shaw and Miller
govern the latter category.
In this Part, we analyze North Carolina's 1992, 1997, and 1998 redistricting plans to determine whether racial or political considerations best explain
the composition of the plans. Our empirical analysis is not meant to suggest
that one should conduct statistical analysis in order to resolve the issues raised
by the Court's wrongful districting jurisprudence. Rather, our analysis is an
independent method of confirming our intuition about the doctrine, which is
that only extreme cases of racial gerrymandering should be subjected to strict
313.

See LUBIN, supra note 62, at 112-14 and sources cited therein, especially with

respect to estimates- ranging from five to twelve- of seats lost in 1994 due to the construction
of majority-minority districts. In reviewing the evidence, David Canon similarly concluded that
the Democrats lost "somewhere around ten seats" after the 1992 and 1994 elections. CANON,
supra note 311, at 257.
314. LUBLIN, supra note 62, at 99 ("The general implication is nevertheless clear. Black
majority districts usually conflict with efforts to maximize African-American substantive
representation. Doing the utmost to advance black interests necessitates destroying most black
majority districts."); id. at 114 ("Racial redistricting has resulted in the election of a Congress
less likely to enact liberal measures favored by African Americans and has greatly altered the
makeup of Congress."); Epstein & O'Halloran, supranote 63, at 390-94.
315. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
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scrutiny.3 16 Our analysis is based upon the social science literature that racial
gerrymandering and political gerrymandering cannot both be maximized.
From this analysis we conclude that the 1997 redistricting plan was a political
gerrymander. To interpret our results, some explanations of our variables are
necessary.
We use Gelman and King's computer program "Judgelt" to measure our
dependent variables: electoral responsiveness and partisan bias.317 Electoral
responsiveness represents the change expected in the partisan composition of
a legislative body as a consequence of changes in the electorate's voting
behavior.3 18 Following Gelman and King, we define electoral responsiveness
"as the change in the expected seat proportion given a small change in the vote
proportion, from slightly more Democratic than the average district vote to
slightly more Republican."319 Following Gelman and King's model, we also
use a swing of 1% in each direction from the election outcome. Responsiveness is thus calculated as the average difference of votes divided by the vote
swing3 2 From this calculation, a responsiveness value of 1.0 indicates that
a 1% increase in the average district vote share for Democrat candidates
statewide will produce a 1% increase in the Democrat share of the state legislature.321 This would, of course, be proportional representation. Similarly, a
responsiveness value of 2.0 indicates that a 1% increase in the average district
vote share for Democrat candidates statewide will produce a 2% increase in
the Democrat share of the state legislature - and so on.
We also operationalize partisan bias using Gelman and King's definition.
Partisan bias is determined by measuring the proportion of seats in the relevant legislature that a party receives over the expected baseline.3 " The
baseline is defined as a symmetry criterion.3" "Forexample," explain Gelman
and King, "if one party is able 'to translate 55% of the average district vote
316.

This model is not of our own creation but one that has been used previously by other

social scientists attempting to acquire some empirical leverage on questions similar to the ones
that we are addressing in this Article. See generally Gelman & King, EnhancingDemocracy,
supra note 23; Hill, supra note 312; Andrew Gelman & Gary King, A Unified Method of
EvaluatingElectoralSystems andRedistrictingPlans,38 AM. . POL. SC. 514 (1 994); Andrew
Gelman & Gary King, Judgelt A Program for Evaluating Electoral Systems and Redistricting
Plans, httpJ/gking.harvard.edu/
stats.shtml (last visited Mar. 21,2001).
317. For an explanation ofthese variables see infra text accompanying notes 326-29.
318. See Gelman & King,EnhancingDemocracy,supra note 23, at 542 (defining electoral
responsiveness).
319. Id. at544.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 545.
323. Id.
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into 75% of the seats in the legislature, then it would be symmetric for the
other party, too, when it receives 55% of the average district vote, to receive
75% of the seats." 324 The bias then is the proportion of seats that a party
receives over and above what one would expect based upon this symmetry
criterion. As a matter of definition, a positive bias value is indicative of bias
in favor of the Democratic Party. Similarly, a negative value is indicative of
a bias in favor of the Republican Party." Thus, a partisan bias value of 0.01
indicates that the Democrats received 1% more seats than they should given
the symmetry criterion. Conversely, a partisan bias value of -0.01 indicates
that the Republicans received 1% more seats than they should.
We use electoral responsiveness and partisan bias to determine which
political variable out of the three most likely explanatory variables - incumbency protection, partisan gerrymandering, and racial gerrymandering - best
explains North Carolina's 1992, 1997, and 1998 redistricting plans. In general, a high degree of responsiveness indicates that voter preferences are
reflected in representative institutions. A high level of responsiveness is then
incompatible with the theories of incumbency protection and partisan gerrymandering. Incumbency protection and partisan gerrymandering are devices

for assuring the stability of representative institutions irrespective of the
changes in voter preferences. 2 Consequently, the lower the value of responsiveness, the more likely it is that the representative institution is the product
of either or both incumbency protection or partisan gerrymandering. 2 In
contrast high levels of responsiveness, in keeping with the trade-off hypothesis, are compatible with a proposition that a representative institution has been
racially gerrymandered. This is because racial gerrymanders create high
levels of uncertainty, particularly for white Southern Democrats, and uncertainty increases the level of responsiveness.3" Moreover, racial gerrymandering is consistent with high partisan bias. Again, there is a trade-off."z
324.
325.
326.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 548 (finding that "by adding incumbents into the electoral system and redistricting process, the increase in responsiveness that results from redistricting is lessened").
327. See id. (describing interaction between responsiveness and redistricting).
328. Uncertainty is created when redistricters reduce the margins of victory. See Gelman
& King,EnhancingDemocracy,supra note 23, at 543 (explaining that "when redistricters draw
lines by jointly maximizing the advantages to their party and their incumbents, they create
additional uncertainty and also produce a direct increase in responsiveness by attempting to gain
partisan advantage by creating more districts with smaller likely victory margins"). Thus
uncertainty also results in greater responsiveness. Id.
329. See BRUCECAN, THEREAPPoRTIONMENTPUZZLE 154-77(1984) (discussing partisanship and redistricting plans); KOUSSER,COLORBLDWINjusTICE, supranote 18, at 409 (arguing
that "[p]artisan and racial concerns were intertwined in redistricting in the 1990s...").
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Consequently, if incumbency protection is the best explanation for one
or all of North Carolina's redistricting plans, we expect to see low levels of
responsiveness. Ifpartisan gerrymandering is the best explanation, we expect
to see high partisan values. If, however, racial gerrymandering is the best
explanation, we expect to see high levels of responsiveness and high partisan
values.
Our data is district-level demographic dataprovided bythe North Carolina
General Assembly.3 3 This dataset contains basic demographic information
including the voting age population for all voters, the percent of registered
voters, and results from three elections - the 1988 Court of Appeals Election,
the 1988 Lieutenant Governor Race, and the 1990 Senate election. These
elections are thought to be indicative of "normal partisan balance. 3 31 Additionally, the parties in the underlying litigation used these elections as appropriate measures of partisan balance.
To compute responsiveness for the 1992 Plan, we first used Judgelt to
calculate responsiveness estimates for each of the three elections that took
place under the Plan- the 1992, 1994, and 1996 elections. We then averaged
the responsiveness over those three elections. For the 1997 Plan, we used
Judgelt to predict responsiveness for the 1992, 1994, and 1996 elections as if
they had taken place under the 1997 Plan. In other words, using the 1997
Plan, weutilized data fromthe 1992, 1994, and 1996 elections to predictwhat
would have happened if those elections had taken place under the 1997 Plan.
For the 1998 Plan, we used Judget to calculate electoral responsiveness based
upon the 1998 elections.
Table 6
Responsiveness Under the 1992 Plan
Election Year
1992
1994
1996

Responsiveness
2.08
2.14
2.23

Standard Error
.3314
.5131
.4374

In Table 6, we present the level of responsiveness under the 1992 Plan
for the 1992, 1994, and 1996 elections. Under the 1992 Plan, every 1% increase in the average district vote share for Democrat candidates statewide
produces a 2.08% increase in Democrat seats forthe 1992 election. Similarly,
in the 1994 election, every 1%increase in the average district vote share for
Democrat candidates statewide produces a 2.14% increase in Democrat seats.
330. North Carolina Redistricting 2000, available at http-i/www.nclegnet/Redistricting/
(last visited on September 1, 2000).
331. Gronke & Wilson, supra note 188, at 162.
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Table 7
Mean Responsivenessfor 1992, 1997, & 1998 Plans
Plan
1992
1997
1998

Mean Responsiveness
2.15
1.68
1.69

Standard Error
0.428
0.4097
0.3846

Table 7 depicts the mean responsiveness for the three plans. As is evident from Table 7, the 1997 and 1998 Plans are on average less responsive
than the 1992 Plan. In other words, in 1997, a 1% increase in the average district vote share for the Democrat candidates statewide would have produced
a 1.68% increase in Democrat seats for the Congress. Similarly, in 1998, a
1% increase in the average district vote share for the Democrat candidates
statewide would have produced a 1.69% increase in Democrat seats for the
Congress.
Table 8
Mean Responsiveness of 1992, 1997, & 1998 Plans
Plans
92 v. 97
92 v. 98
97 v. 98

T-statistic
10.553
10.783
N/A

Level of Significance
.000
.008
N/A

In Table 8, we conducted paired t-tests for the difference of means
between the plans. The 1997 and 1998 Plans are indistinguishable from one
another and could not be computed. The 1997 and 1998 Plans are, however,
distinguishable from the 1992 Plans. As Table 8 reveals, means reported in
Table 8 achieve conventional levels of statistical significance. Therefore, we
can confidently
assert that the 1997 and 1998 Plans are less responsive than
332
Plan.
1992
the
We also utilized Judgeltto calculate partisan bias for the 1992, 1997, and
1998 Plans. For the 1992 Plan, we calculated partisan bias estimates for the
1992, 1994, and 1996 elections. We then averaged those estimates to arrive
at a mean estimate for 1992. For the 1997 Plan, we used JudgeItto predict the
332. Our parameters are congruent with those of other researchers such as Gelman and
King and Kevin Hill. Professor Hill examined eight southern states that created majorityminority districts and found that the average responsiveness for those states was 1.88 and the
average partisan bias was 33%. Hill, supra note 312, at 393, tbl.2. Gelman and King note that
most "states have responsiveness values between 1.0 and 3.0." Gelman & King, Enhancing
Democracy, supranote 23, at 545; see id. (finding that partisan bias figures "between 5% favoring the Democrats to 5% favoring the Republicans").
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partisan bias of the 1997 Plan using the 1992, 1994, and 1996 elections. We
also averaged those estimates to arrive at a mean partisan bias estimate for the
1997 Plan. We calculated the partisan bias for the 1998 Plan using the 1998
elections.
Table 9
Mean Biasfor 1992, 1997, & 1998 Plans
Plans
92
97
98

Bias
0.0146
-0.0035
0.0031

S.E.
.0278
.0384
.0239

T-Statistic
0.5258
-0.0929
1.385

As is evident from Table 9, the 1992 Plan assured the Democrats 1.5%
more seats than they should have received given the symmetry criterion. This
measure would be consistent with the racial gerrymandering hypothesis were
we confident that our estimate significantly differs from zero. However, given
the high standard errors and the low coefficient, we cannot conclude that the
1992 Plan suffered frompartisan bias. The 1997 and 1998 Plans do not register any partisan bias. Again, none of these results reach conventional levels
of significance.
From the evidence presented here and in light of traditional burdens of
proof, the plaintiffs in Cromartiewould be hard pressed to prove that racial
gerrymandering is the best explanation for the 1997 Plan. The 1997 Plan is
clearly less responsive than the 1992 Plan. This finding is inconsistent with
the racial gerrymandering hypothesis. Additionally, there is no evidence of
partisan bias. The absence of partisan bias in combination with low levels of
responsiveness is more indicative of incumbency protection than racial gerrymandering. As we note above, were the 1997 Plan a racial gerrymander, we
would expect high levels of responsiveness and high levels of partisan bias;
this is exactly what we have for the 1992 Plan.
Our findings are consistent with the trade-offhypothesis. In keeping with
the trade-off hypothesis, in 1992, compactness and to some extent contiguity
were the political factors that gave way to incumbent protection and racial
gerrymandering. However, in 1998, when the 12th District was more compact
and contiguous, the Democrats suffered one of their worst losses in three
decades. It is not implausiblethat North Carolina's Democrats, in enacting the
1997 Plan, would have attempted to minimize their potential losses, which
were quite predictable, by institutionalizing the results ofthe 1996 elections.
We thus conclude that the district court reached the wrong result in
holding that the 1997 Plan was not a political gerrymander. In reaching this
conclusion, the court failed to appreciate the constraint that political variables
have on the redistricting process. In so doing, it concluded that District 12
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was unconstitutional by disaggregating that district from the districting plan.
However, the evidence is extremely convincing that the 1997 Plan, in contrast
with the 1992 Plan, was a political gerrymander. The State attempted to minimize the level of responsiveness in the 1997 Plan, which is a strong indication of a political as opposed to a racial gerrymander.
IV Back to the Doctrine: Implications
In this final Part, we look to the doctrinal implications of our position.
We divide our discussion into two sections. Inthe first, we reassess the import
of Shaw Ts analytically distinct claim within its specific procedural context
and conclude that Shaw-like claims must be fewer and farther in between. In
the second, we then look ahead to the upcoming redistricting season. In light
of our general position, we make two further points, one practical, the other
doctrinal. The practical point is simply this: The 1990s was a unique decade
in terms of redistricting and judicial intervention; as such, we view Shaw I as
a unique case. The doctrinal point departs from this premise and argues that
Shaw Imust thus be located within the larger gerrymandering doctrine, alongside its sure-fire cousin Davis v. Bandemer. Under our revised reading of
Shaw I, racial gerrymandering claims gravitate towards their political gerry,
mandering counterparts. In fact, they become one and the same. Taken together, these two arguments lead us to the view that the nightmare that is
North Carolina redistricting in the 1990s should not be repeated.
A. Reassessing Shaw: The CorrectiveReading
As a result of the redistricting realities witnessed in North Carolina and
Texas, we are led to a more deferential model of judicial review than the
Court currently utilizes in racial gerrymandering claims. This is not to say
that Shaw I was wrongly decided, for we do not take a view on that specific
question. Instead, 'wemake a more general claim. We argue here that in its
best light, Shaw I must be seen as a special case, arising under fact-specific
circumstances. Seen through this prism, and as we argue below, Cromartie
H becomes a fairly easy case.
Our argument in this Part hinges on a clear understanding of the context
within which the Shaw litigation arose. Commentators have ably documented
this history and we need not duplicate their efforts."3 3 For our purposes, three
facts bear mention at this juncture. First, the Democratic party in North
333. See CLAYrONsupra note 278, at 40-77 (describing North Carolina's first redistricting
plan, Justice Department objections to this plan, and North Carolina's subsequent creation of
second majority-minority district); . Morgan Kousser, Shaw v. Reno and the Real World of
Redistrictingand Representation, 26 RUTGRS L.L 625, 693-705 (1995) (discussing North
Carolina redistricting process).
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Carolina approached the 1990s redistricting season with the clear intention of
maximizing its short-term electoral power, as reflected in the upcoming round
of congressional elections. Having accomplished its goal too well, it submitted the fruits of its labor to the Justice Department.
Second, the Justice Department objected to the original plan, for it only
included one majority-minority district. According to the Justice Department,
a second majority-minority district could be crafted from the south central to
southeast region of the state. This request threatened to unravel the Denocrats' plan. The issue thus became, who would bear the cost for the new
majority-minority district? In packing black (and predominantly Democratic)
voters into districts, the theory went, the Republican party would benefit. The
reverse would hold true with the original plan, which only included one
minority-minority district and dispersed black voters along Democrat districts.
Third, the Justice Department's request was clearly aimed at the population located in the southeast region of-the state. Yet, the Democrats reasoned
that this did not mean that they had to draw the second majority-minority
district in the southeast region. At the time, this was an open issue, and as it
turned out, the answer proved to be crucial. As we know, the state legislature
felt free to draw the district wherever it pleased. Put differently, the federal
demand for a second majority-minority district needed to be balanced against
the still present need for upholding the pre-existing partisan balance in the
state's congressional delegation. Thus, the Democrats did all there was left
to do: They crafted the now infamous, tortuously contoured District 12. The
circumstances, as they apparently understood them, left the Democrats no
other choice.
The doctrinal record is now quite familiar. In Shaw I, the Supreme Court
subjected District 12 to strict constitutional scrutiny. A few years later, in
Shaw v. Hunt (ShawRI), the Court overturned the lower court ruling and struck
down the district on equal protection grounds. In so doing, the Court simply
answered the initial redistricting question, the one question left open after the
Justice Department demanded the creation of a second majority-minority
district, in the negative. That is, once the Justice Department refused preclearance, the State was not free to create a second majority-minority district anywhere it wished to do so, and by any means necessary. To say that a second
majority-minority district could be created in the southeastern region of the
state, the Court implicitly answered, is334not to say that the district could be
created anywhere that the state wished.
See Shaw %,517U.S. 899, 916-17 (1996). InShaw H, the Court stated:
[Appllefes] contend that once a legislature has a strong basis in evidence for concluding that a § 2 violation edsts in the State, it may draw a majority-minority district anywhere, even if the district is in no way coincident with the compact Gingles

334.
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Seen this way, Shaw I becomes a very easy case. As we explained
earlier, the 1990 redistricting season produced an unprecedented number of
majority-minority districts. In light of the Court's equal protection jurisprudence, these districts raised, at the very least, difficult constitutional questions. Whether or not one agrees that the VRA must be understood to maximize minority representation in the form of minority officeholders, it is still
true that the Act was being manipulated for clear partisan reasons.335 This
manipulation was exacting constitutional and political costs. As we see in
Shaw , such costs included those of the "expressive harms" variety.
In light of this history, Shaw Iitself must be seen as a doctrinal corrective. -Redistricters in the early 1990s paid very little heed to their constitutional duties. After all, they knew their precedents well. These precedents
told them that "reapportionment is primarily the duty and responsibility ofthe
State. 3 36 Thus, after the demand for a second majority-minority district, the
redistricters felt free to draw it any way possible. After all, the constitutionality of the plan was not a predominant concern of the redistricters. Rather,
their major concern was partisan advantage, as it must have been.3 7
In offering this reading of Shaw , we must emphasize that we do not take
a view on whether Shaw I is correct as a matter of constitutional law. Our
intentions are somewhat more limited. We read Shaw I with the benefit of
hindsight and attempt to understand it on its own terms. We read Shaw I for
the proposition that only extreme cases of racial redistricting will be subject
to strict scrutiny and likely invalidation. It is in this manner that Shaw I must
be understood as a corrective. Justice O'Connor dissipated any skepticism
about this reading of Shaw I with her concurrence to her plurality opinion in
Bush v. Vera.
If the view we take here is correct, Cromariei immediately becomes a
much easier case. With Shaw I, the stakes changed, as well as the doctrinal
context. This second time, redistricters knew their limitations (they knew
there were limitations!) and maybe assumed to have acted accordingly. Thus,
when the General Assembly redistricted a second time, in 1997, the original
constitutional question whether a second majority-minority district could be
district, as long as racially polarized voting exists where the district is ultimately
drawn. We find this position singularly unpersuasive.

Id (citations omitted).
335. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71
TEx. L. REV. 1705, 1726-37 (1993) (concluding that "the Voting RightsAct is ripe for partisan
capture"); Karlan, supra note 142, at 297 n.60 (asserting that "disappointed aspirants for elective office use whatever statutory handle is available to challenge the otherwise unreviewable
outcomes of the political process").
336. Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1,27 (1975).
337. This assumes, of course, that they are rational actors.
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drawn anywhere within the state was settled. Instead, the question the second
time around was whether the General Assembly, as the rational institution we
must assume it to be, read the relevant precedents and acted accordingly. In
this vein, it should not be surprising that the 1997 Plan created no majorityminority districts in terms of registered voters. We must assume that the General Assembly learned its constitutional lessons well.
Sam Issacharoff and Alex Aleinikoff have developed - and rejected - a
similar reading of Shaw I, which they label the "cueing" reading. 338 They
wrote that such a reading is simply "a shot across the bow," a warning to the
relevant political actors to pay more careful attention to their constitutional
duties.33 9 In specific reference to Shaw I, they explained that the Court may be
understood as choosing an extreme case in order to "emphasize that at some
point the use of race in redistricting decisions had gone too far."i
However,
this is at best an infelicitous reading ofthe case. They explained:
The possibilitythatShawisa "cueing" case is cause for consternation. Such
decisions mightbe appropriatevehicles for interbranch communications in
areas of law unlikely to spawn much litigation - for example, federalism
limits on congressional power. But reapportionment cases demand a willingness on the part of the Court to develop and supervise an extensive
scheme for review of state districting decisions. Voting-rights cases are
numerous, complex, and fact specific. Perhaps more centrally, these cases
involve large numbers ofinterested parties who canbe expected to exploit
any uncertainty in the law. Therefore, in the voting-rights context, vague
norms, especiallynorms that maynotbe enforced at all, willproduce costly
litigation and serious uncertainty about important political events."
They concluded, rather ominously: "Surely the Court is aware ofthese troubling consequences, and it is unlikely the Court would issue a 'cueing' opinion
3 42
in this volatile area of the law.1
Once again, hindsight comes in handy. Looking to the string of cases
from Shaw Ito CromartWe1H, we know that federal courts have been much too
happy to micromanage inthis area. In one telling instance, a federal court went
so far as to design a redistricting plan even before ruling on the unconstitutionality of the existing plan.343 A majority of the Supreme Court gave this second
338.

Aleinikoff& Issacharoff, supra note 67, at 603-04.

339.
340.

Id. at 603.
Id. at 604.

341.

Id.

342.

Id

343. See Johnson v. Miller, 922 F. Supp. 1556, 1560 (S.D. Ga. 1995) (theorizing that"[b]y
virtue of its unconstitutional origin, Georgia's current congressional plan cannot form the basis
for the remedy we now construct because it does not represent the goals of Georgia's historic
policies nor the state legislature's true intent").
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plan its blessing.3" Thus, to saythat federal courts should not "issue a 'cueing'
opinion in this volatile area of the law" is not to say that the Court has not done
so. 4' We would agree, to be clear, that the Court ought not to use Shaw I as
such a conduit. The history of-the Shaw Ilitigation, however, points us exactly
in this direction." 6 In other words, the concerns Aleinikoff and Issacharoff
raised in 1993 are exactly the concerns that have come to pass during the
1990s. To be clear, this is neither right nor wrong; it is just the way it is.
B. The FutureIs Here: The 2000 Census, Expressive Harms, and the
Next Round ofRedistricting
In this final Part, we look to the implications of our position in light of
the upcoming redistricting season. Two positions stand out, and we address
them individually. The first argument questions whether the expressive harms
inquiry must be reserved solely for majority-minority districts, or whether
it
may be applied, as in Cromartie,to a majority white district. The second
argument looks to the gerrymandering doctrine in general and asks whether
Shaw Iis better understood, in strict doctrinal terms, from the perspective of
the more deferential Davis.
1. Expressive Harms andMajority White Districts
In reviewing the facts inthe Cromartielitigation, one specific facet ofthe
litigation immediately caught our attention: Neither district under review
should be properly considered a majority-minority district. District 1, as we
explained earlier, may be considered a majority-minority district only if we
use the rather useless measure of total population, and even then barely so.
In terms of voting age population and registered voters, the district is majority
white. Similarly, District 12 may be considered a majority white district along
all three measurements. The question is whether Shaw rs "expressive harms"
doctrine should apply to either District 1 or District 12. We argue here that
as soon as the districts in question dip below majority-minority status, the "ex-

pressive harms" inquiry immediately is rendered incongruous and incoherent.
In making this claim, we begin with a quote from the relevant language
of Shaw L As the Court explained:
Putdifferently, webelievethatreapportionmentisoneareainwhichappearances do matter. Areapportionmentplanthatincludes in one district indi344. See Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 101 (1997) (holding that trial court accounted
for traditional districting factors and met equal protection requirements in fashioning its plan).
345. Aleinikoff& Issacharoft supra note 67, at 604.
346. See Lowenstein, supra note 271, at 812-19 (arguing that federal courts in redistricting
cases have acted with "utter indifference" to autonomy of state political systems).
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viduals who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by geographical and political boundaries, and who mayhave little in
commonwithoneanotherbutthecoloroftheirskin,bearsanuncomfortable
resemblancetopoliticalapartheid. Itreinforcestheperceptionthatmembers
of the same racial group - regardless of their age, education, economic
status, or the community in which they live - think alike, share the same
political interests, and will preferthe same candidates atthepolls. We have
rejected such perceptions elsewhere as impermissible racial stereotypes.
This language points us in two related directions. First, and as Aleinikoff and
Issacharoff wrote soon after Shaw I, "[w]hen the gerynander has a visible
racial component, the Court implicitly reasons, the districting decision flashes
the message: 'RACE, RACE, RACE.' A 'natural' compact district sends no
such message, even if it has been defined to create a majority-minority district. 3 48 John Ely has made a similar argument."
On this reading, the
Court, and specifically Justice O'Connor, is concerned with the excessive reliance on race, which is what we termed earlier uber-race consciousness. 5 °
Only then does
Justice O'Connor's position that "most districts are safe" make
3 51
any sense.
In order for the Court's language to make any sense, then, the districts at
issue must be of the majority-minority variety. That is, in order for a district
to convey the messages that the Court imputes to it, the district must in fact
be designed with a majority-minority population within it. Otherwise, Shaw
I makes very little sense. Imagine it this way: We have a covered jurisdiction and the existence of a racially polarized electorate. Ignore for the moment whether safe district status requires 45 or 50% plus one minority population.352 Ignore also whether influence districts or majority-minority districts
are the best way to effect successful minority representation.353 As far as
347. Shaw , 509 U.S. 630,647 (1993).
348. Alcinikoff& Issacharoft supranote 67, at 610-11.
349. See Ely, supranote 52, at 615 (noting that these districts may be interpreted to convey
message: "Is
there no length to which they won't go to help Black people?").
350. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (defining "uber-race").
351. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 991-92 (1996) (explaining that Section 2 is compelling state interest); Mller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 928-29 (1995) ("Application of the
Court's standard does not throw into doubt the vast majority of the nation's 435 congressional
districts...."). Fora similar reading of ShawI, see Pildes, supra note 21, at 2510 ("The excessive use of race, not racial classification per se, generates Shaw harms.").
352. Compare LUBLIN, supra note 62, at 133 (arguing that safe seat is reached with only
55% ofregistered voters), with Cameron et al.,supra note 151 (lowering Lublin's figure to 47%).
353. Compare O'Rourke, supra note 279, at 725-28 (arguing that majority-minority districts help Republicans), with Pamela S. KarlanLossandRedemption: VotingRights attheEnd
ofthe Century, 50 VAND.L. REv.291,293 (1997) (disagreeing with claimihat "the creation of
majority-Black districts has perversely injured the very people they were thought to help").
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those living within the district are concerned, the only way that one may get
the message that any given group thinks alike, votes alike, and so on, would
be when redistricters create bizarre districts with minority populations within
them. In order for the "expressive harms" doctrine to make any sense, these
two facts must be present simultaneously: The district must be both majorityminority and bizarre.
Justice O'Connor's published opinions lead us to this position. She has
stated in no uncertain terms that redistricters may take race into account 35 4
and she also has stated that most districts are safe from constitutional
scrutiny. 55 Also, in her view, the mere creation ofmajority-minority districts,
without more, will not result in strict judicial scrutiny."' From her vantage
point, much more is needed.
Thus, at least for the types of claims Shaw I spurred, the creation of
majority white districts with a significant minority presence should provide
a safe haven for redistricters from overzealous partisans seeking to affect the
redistricting process through judicial means. For the coming round of redistricting, state legislators should do as North Carolina's General Assembly did:
Bring the numbers of your new districts to about 50% and the Constitution
will not be implicated. In contrast, this is not to say that states will feel free
to reduce all existing majority-minority districts to under 50% minority population. Doing so would implicate the VRA. In light of the retrogression
principle, the unprecedented creation of majority-minority districts after the
1990 reapportionment helps ensure that the next reapportionment will witness
a strong contingent of majority-minority districts. 35 7 Again, we do not take a
In this vein, Paul Peterson argued that "[w]hat emerges from an open political process is
likely to be the appropriate balance" between using race some and too much for classificatory
purposes. Paul E.Peterson, A Politically Correct Solution to Racial Classification, in CLASSIFYING BY RACE

3, 16 (Paul E.Peterson ed., 1995). For an argument regarding the acknowledgely hard question of how much congressional representation is enough, see Gary King et al.,
RacialFairnessinLegislativeRedistricting, in CLASSIFYINGBYRACE,supra, at 85,107-08.

354. See Vera, 517 U.S. at 993 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[S]o long as they do not
subordinate traditional districting criteria to the use of race for its own sake or as a proxy, States
may intentionally create majority-minority districts, and may otherwise take race into consider-

ation, without coming under strict scrutiny.").
355.

See Miller, 515 U.S. at 928-29 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("Application ofthe Court's

standard does not throw into doubt the vast majority of the Nation's 435 congressional districts,
where presumably the States have drawn the boundaries in accordance with their customary
districting principles. That is so even though race may well have been considered in the redis-

tricting process.").
356. See Vera, 517 U.S. at 958 (plurality opinion) ("Strict scrutiny does not apply merely
because redistricting is performed with consciousness of race. Nor does it apply to all cases of
intentional creation of majority-minority districts.") (citations omitted).
357. See Lowenstein, supra note 271, at 825 ("[A]lthough section 5 will have to be imple-

mented in accord with the nonretroggression principle, that principle will have teeth for the first
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view about the desirability of these districts. Ours is but a descriptive claim,
nothing more.
2. GerrymanderingClaims and the Future of Shaw
Our reading of the Shaw I doctrine raises critical doctrinal questions,
especially in light of the upcoming round of reapportionment. In this final
Part, we come full circle and offer a prognosis of the racial gerrymandering
cause of action spawned by Shaw I. We divide this Part into two subparts. In
the first, we depart from the premise that Shaw I and Miller stand in direct
doctrinal tension. For the sake of doctrinal clarity, the Court must choose
between the two. In the second, we address the implications of our argument
that racial and political considerations serve as mutual constraints upon one
another. We conclude that the doctrine should better reflect this reality.
The first point begins with the mundane observation that Shaw I and
Miller stand on divergent constitutional principles. As we explained earlier,
Shaw I requires the presence of a bizarre district, while a Miller violation,
conversely, is established when the use of race predominates in the creation
of a given district. The Miller Court made vastly clear that plaintiffs could
establish such a violation irrespective of shape."" The question of the proper
doctrinal course remains.
In light of the facts at issue in Cromartie and the likelihood that redistricters will follow a similar path after the next reapportionment, we argue that
the Court must side with its holding in Shaw L More specifically, the fact that
the districts at issue in Cromartiewere majority-white makes all the difference in the world. Any such districts must be subject to Shaw Ts bizarre
reading, under which only extreme cases will be implicated. For the unconvinced, we look instead to the repercussions that would result from following
Miller's predominant factor test. Of specific concern is the fact that doing so
would leave the doctrine without a limiting principle. That is, when would the
Equal Protection Clause be specifically implicated? What, to put this question
differently, will cabin the level of analysis? Will the doctrine be implicated
even when one person is moved qua a black person from one district to
time in the next round of redistricting because of a large number of MMDs created around the
country after the 1990 census."). This is not to say, as Pamela Karlan explained, that assessing
the proper retrogression baseline will be simple. See Karlan, supra note 21, at 747-52 (explain-

ing that current case law makes it difficult to assess retrogression).
358. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 913 (1995) (recognizing that district shape is
relevant not because bizarreness is necessary element of constitutional wrong or threshold
requirement of proof, but because district shape may be persuasive circumstantial evidence that
race, for its own sake, and not other districting principles, was legislature's dominant and controlling rationale in drawing district lines).
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another? Were the Court to follow the Miller test under Cromartie's fact
scenario, this would be the likely result. This result also would be perverse.
The second point looks to the clear tension between political and racial
considerations present in the "racial" gerrymandering cases. It is clear to us
that the Court must make a choice. In other words, the Court must decide
whether these cases are either political or racial cases. In light of the specific
facts at issue in the case law from Shaw Ito CromartieII, we are convinced
that this is all about politics. Three specific considerations lead us to this
view. First, we rely on plain old common sense. That is - why would redistricters ever care about race? Think back to the North Carolina example and
the pressures faced by the General Assembly that led to the redistricting plan
challenged in Shaw L To be sure, redistricters face a number of competing
pressures, many of which have a direct effect on the final plan. Yet, why in
the world would race be one of these considerations, absent the VRA? Plain
and simple, it would not be. It is for this particular reason that Shaw I may
make sense in ways thatMillerdoes not. Second, we parse through the record
and the opinions in the various cases. The history and context of the cases
make it vastly clear that politics played a central role in both the shapes of the
districts and even in the original decision to create majority-minority disalso support this conclusion.
tricts.359 Third, the data we offer in Part m11
be obvious. Plain and simple,
should
conclusion
The implications ofthis
to conclude that the tension between race and politics should be resolved on
the side of politics is to say that the so-called "racial" cases directly implicate
the political gerrymandering doctrine as represented by Davs.s ° In light of
this view, we conclude that the racial gerrymandering claims must be reconsidered in light oftheir political counterpart. This shift unquestionably would
be determinative.361
By all accounts, Davis provides a rather loose standard for establishing a
political gerrymandering claim. Some would go as far as to deem its doctrinal
bite illusory. The U.S. Reports bear this latter assertion out. Since the time of
the Davis decision, plaintiffs have challenged many political gerrymanders in
359. See KoUSSER, COLORBLIND INUSTICEsupra note 18,at262-70 (describing redistricting process in North Carolina); id. at 409-11 (same).
360. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
361. We develop this argument in much fuller form elsewhere. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer,
Gerrymandering, Equal Protection, and the Modem Redistricting Revolution: A Plea for Due
Deference 3 (unpublished manuscript, on file with Washington & Lee Law Review) (arguing
that political factors "should lead to a more careful, even deferential approach to redistricting

questions"); Guy-Uriel E. Charles, How Race Matters: Racial and Political Identity in the
Racial Redistricting Cases 4 (unpublished manuscript, on file with Washington and Lee Law
Review) (arguing that "the Court's political gerrymandering case, Davis v. Bandemer, provides
the best doctrinal standard for resolving wrongful districting claims").
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federal court; yet very few have succeeded.3 62 In contrast, the Shaw I doctrine
has witnessed much litigation, and plaintiffs have achieved a very high rate of
success. To be sure, the two doctrines stand on divergent paths.
One of the thrusts of our earlier exposition of the lower court record in
Cromarile is to indicate how little sense these two approaches make. As we
argue here, courts should handle the "racial" gerrymandering cases just like
the political gerrymandering cases because the race cases are not really about
race after all. They are about politics. Thus, the Court should choose the Davis
path and apply it across the board. On this reading, the lower court opinion in
Cromartiemust be overturned.
Before concluding, we wish to answer what promises to be two leading
objections to our position. First, and as we alluded earlier, critics will complain that the Davis standard posits such a high burden on litigants that its
holding is at best illusory. Second, critics may suggest that our reading will
leave racial minorities without their traditional judicial recourse. In other
words, this position will lead states to create fewer and fewer majority-minority districts and will ultimately "bleach" our representative arenas. Neither
criticism persuades us.
The first criticism we take to be a virtue of our position. To the critics,
the Court must do more in the political gerrymandering cases. To us, conversely, the Court must do less under the "analytically distinct" Shaw I cause
of action. As we argued earlier, we take the Shaw line of cases to be nothing
more than a reshuffling of previously attained political compromises. In their
worst light, some of the districting plans in question may be seen as crass
political gerrymanders, enacted in the expected furtherance of maximum
political gain 363 On either view, the judiciary must do less.
The second criticism also falls short. To be sure, we share the general
concern about the question of "fair and effective representation. 1 3' This is
especially true concerning racial minorities, and yet, this area epitomizes our
position about the Court's recent interventionist stance in the name of a colorblind Constitution. That is, we place our faith in the virtues ofthe VRA and its
statutory protections as codified in Sections 2 and 5.36S We do not share a
362.
To date, the only case to succeed on Davis groundsis Republican Party ofiNorth Carolina v. Martin, 980 F.2d943 (4th Cir. 1992), cert denied, 510 U.S. 828 (1993), on remandsub
nom. RepublicanParty ofNorth Carolina v. Hunt,841 F. Supp. 722 (E6DN.C. 1994) (granting
preliminary injunction), afd sub nom. Republican Party of North Carolina v. State Board of
Elections, 27 F.3d 563 (4th Cir. 1994) (per curiam).
363. The North Carolina plan under challenge in Shaw I,for example, and the Texas plan
challenged in Vera would both fall under this characterization.
364. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,565 (1964).
365. In this vein, the process that led from City ofMobile to the amended Section 2 may be
said to encapsulate our approach. That is to say, racial minorities fare sufficiently well within
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similar conviction over the virtues of federal judges. In specific reference to
the protection of racial minorities in the voting rights area, we argue that
Section 2 ofthe VRA should serve as the ultimate benchmark. Absent Section
2 violations, in other words, the challenged redistricting plans should be left
alone.
Conclusion
The central claim running though this Article is that the redistricting
process is necessarily fraught with racial and political dimensions. In pure
doctrinal terms, it may be said that these two considerations stand at opposite
ends of the spectrum. Political considerations are scrutinized under Davis v.
Bandemer's forgiving standard, while race is subject to Shaw i's stricter level
of review. The challenge in the wrongful districting cases is not a doctrinal
one, however, but a purely factual one. In other words, the key to these cases
is whether, not to mention how, a fact finder is able to disentangle properly
these two ubiquitous strands.
As we argue in this Article, we are not optimistic. To date, federal courts
have made valiant attempts at doing exactly that and, quite frankly, have been
far from persuasive. We offer the lower court records in both Hunt v. Cromartie and Vera v. Bush as proof for this proposition. In the end, federal
courts decide cases while departing from the foregone conclusion that the
plans in question are unconstitutional on the basis of race. Unfortunately, as
we argued earlier, the facts are not always as helpful as the courts would need
them to be.
We thus conclude that it is now time to abandon the expressive harms
enterprise and resort to the much more relaxed Davis standard. Two reasons
lead us to this view. We have already explained the first: Courts simply are
unable to disentangle racial from political considerations. The court records,
common sense, and statistical data all support this assertion. Justice Thomas
provides a foundation for the second. As he wrote in his concurring opinion
in Holder v. Hall: 'We would be mighty Platonic guardians indeed if Congress had granted us the authority to determine the best form of local government for every county, city, village, and town in America. ' s3s And yet, he
continued:
the pluralistic bazaar. They do not need the judiciary to do their bidding for them. See
GIRARDEAU SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT AND MINORimES IN

CONTEMPORARYAMERICA 3 (1993) (contemplating that best course of action is for minorities
"to avoid the Supreme Court and to concentrate on ordinary politics as the means for advancing
minority interests"); see also Karlan, supra note 21 (making specific reference to voting rights
arena).
366. Holderv. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 913 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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[U]nder our constitutional system, this Court is nota centralizedpolitburo
appointed for life to dictate to the provinces the'correct' theories of democratic representation, the 'best' electoral systemsforsecuringtruly'repres ntative' government, the 'fairest' proportions ofminoritypoliticalinfluence,
or, as respondents would have us hold today, the 'proper' sizes for local
governing bodies.'
His point was aimed expressly at the Court's Section 2 jurisprudence.
On it own terms, however, it may be extrapolated to the "expressive harms"
area. Without question, the Court is acting like the Platonic guardians that
Justice Thomas and many others so deride. Worse yet, the Court is sending
with these cases, and its racial cases in general, a much more pernicious
message:
The Court's decisions, with theirheatedrhetoric about "political apartheid"
and "balkaniz[ation]" andtheirpotential evictionofhalftheblackmembers
of Congress, are far more likely than race-conscious districting "to carry
us further from the goal of a political system in which race no longer
matters - a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody
and to which the Nation continues to aspire."I
To our minds, this is an expressive harm of a far more noxious form. 3 69 Its
time has come.

367. Id.
368. Karlan, supranote 142, at 287,311 (citation omitted).
369. See Karlan, supra note 142, at 305 ("[T]o tell black citizens, who have organized to
lobby for and obtain the districts they prefer, that their common interests are illusory or
unworthy of satisfaction is chillingly reminiscent of the assertion that blacks have 'no rights
which the white man [is] bound to respect'") (citations omitted). See generally Higginbotham
ct al., supra note 267 (calling on Supreme Court to modify Shaw I before it results in decline
of recent black political gains).
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